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THE DIVERSITY DOUBLE STANDARD*
SUNG Hui KIm**
In Grutter and Gratz (2003), the twin cases that challenged the
University of Michigan's affirmative action programs, corporate
America praised educational diversity as a compelling interest. But as
is well known, it did so not on social justice grounds but on the
empirical claim that "diversity is good for business." In particular,
education in a diverse environment would produce better workers for
an increasingly global and competitive economy. This position has
since been echoed in corporate pronouncements about diversity in
corporate workplaces and boardrooms. Generally speaking,
corporations have justified voluntary affirmative action within the firm
only to the extent that it furthers their bottom line-i.e., only if there is a
"business case" for diversity. On the surface, the corporate stances
toward educational diversity on the one hand and corporate diversity
on the other hand seem entirely consistent. Both emphasize a
consequentialist logic and economic rationale. But if one probes more
deeply, an intriguing distinction appears. Regarding corporate
diversity, corporations are advocating nothing more than what is
already in their own economic self-interest. By contrast, when it comes
to educational diversity, corporations recommend it regardless of the
university's economic self-interest. This Article argues that these
positions amount to a double standard. After justifying this
characterization, this Article provides a possible explanation for why
the double standard exists by drawing on the psychology of human
sociality in order to explore how we think differently about the
commercial and educational realms. It concludes by pointing out that
in light of this double standard, corporate America's public position on
diversity amounts to little more than support for diversity in the
abstract so long as corporations don't have to pay for it.
* @ 2011 Sung Hui Kim.
** Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Please send comments to
kim.sung@law.ucla.edu. I am grateful for comments and advice received from Iman
Anabtawi, Lynn Stout, and participants of the conference Board Diversity and Corporate
Performance: Filling in the Gaps sponsored by the University of North Carolina School of
Law and Duke University School of Law. Excellent research assistance was provided by Dan
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INTRODUCTION
Many progressives praised the corporate amicus intervention in
Grutter v. Bollinger' and Gratz v. Bollinger,2 the twin cases brought
before the United States Supreme Court in 2003. The question
presented was whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibited the
University of Michigan College and Law School from voluntarily
adopting affirmative action programs designed to increase minority
student enrollment. In one of the two main amicus curiae briefs,"
sixty-five distinguished business corporations' loudly affirmed the
value of educational diversity to the business sector: " '[T]he skills
and training needed to succeed in business today demand exposure to
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 259-60. Although I recognize that
there are many different forms of diversity-including racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual
orientation diversity-in this Article, my focus is on racial and ethnic diversity because
that particular type of diversity was specifically challenged in Grutter and Gratz, the two
cases on educational diversity. As noted below, I will compare the corporate positions on
educational and corporate diversity.
4. General Motors ("GM") submitted one of the two main amicus briefs. See Brief
of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (No. 02-241), Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516) [hereinafter GM Briefj. The second
brief was submitted by sixty-five businesses, and GM did not sign it. See Brief for Amici
Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
(No. 02-241), Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Sixty-five Businesses Brief].
Additionally, "British Petroleum (BP) attempted to submit a brief supporting affirmative
action on similar grounds, although it declined to take a position on whether the specific
programs at issue in the Michigan cases should be upheld." David B. Wilkins, From
"Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good For Business": The Rise of Market-
Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1548, 1552 n.26 (2004) (citing Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Out of Time and
Brief of BP America Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2-3, Grutter,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516) [hereinafter BP Brief]).
5. By "business corporations" or "corporations," I generally refer to businesses
organized as for-profit corporations who signed the corporate amicus curiae briefs and
exclude nonprofit corporations, including universities.
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widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints,' and this
exposure is needed at 'every level of an organization.' "6 The brief
warned that firms must be able to recruit from a talented pool of
racially and ethnically diverse student bodies for American business
to succeed in the competitive global economy. In essence, corporate
support for educational diversity was premised on the claim that
"diversity is good for business,"' which I will refer to here as the
"business case for diversity."9
Notably, the corporations did not try to argue any corrective or
distributive justice rationale as a compelling interest to justify the
affirmative action programs. As David Wilkins observed, "[n]either
corporate brief makes more than a passing reference to the moral
arguments in favor of helping blacks to overcome slavery,
segregation, or the stigma of racism . .. .""o Instead, they focused on
what was most doctrinally available after Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke"-the pedagogical value of diversity as a
compelling interest.12 And by showing that the business community
6. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of
the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 795, 797
(quoting Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 4, at 5-6).
7. Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 4, at 5-6; see also Wilkins, supra note 4, at
1553.
8. Wilkins, supra note 4, at 1553.
9. Id. passim (referring throughout to "the business case for diversity"); cf Fairfax,
supra note 6, at 797 (noting the presence of business rationales for diversity in the Gratz
and Grutter corporate amicus briefs and examining the "viability of these business
rationales for diversity in an effort to determine whether such rationales can or should be
used as a basis for justifying efforts to increase board diversity"); Wilkins, supra note 4, at
1554 (chronicling the rise of "market-based diversity arguments in the legal profession").
10. Wilkins, supra note 4, at 1553.
11. 438 U.S. 265 (1987).
12. The most important precedent for Gratz and Grutter at the time was Bakke, which
authorized public colleges and universities to use race as a factor in admissions while
specifically striking down U.C. Davis's affirmative action plan, which set aside spaces for
racial and ethnic minorities. Id. at 317-20. As detailed by Rachel Moran, "[t]he Bakke case
split the Court four-to-four with Powell ... as the crucial swing vote." Rachel F. Moran,
Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Parents Involved, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 1321, 1345 (2008). Powell's critical plurality opinion offered a way out of the
impasse between the color-blind and color-conscious approaches to interpreting the U.S.
Constitution. See id at 1345-47. "Although Powell agreed that racial classifications were
inherently suspect and therefore triggered the most searching level of judicial scrutiny," he
did not categorically bar governments from relying on voluntary race-conscious policies.
Id. at 1346. Turning to the First Amendment and the tradition of academic freedom in
higher education, Powell appealed to the "pedagogical rationale for voluntary affirmative
action," emphasizing prospective benefits rather than past wrongs. Id. at 1346-47.
"According to Powell, diversity was a compelling interest because it promoted the free
exchange of ideas by nurturing an 'atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation.' " Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312). As a result, Bakke paved
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did care," this intervention may have influenced Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Grutter, which prominently cited both corporate
amicus briefs.14
Now, compare this corporate stance toward educational diversity
with that toward corporate diversity-the way that affirmative action
might operate within the firm itself. By "corporate diversity," I refer
to affirmative action efforts by for-profit business corporations to
expand both workplace diversity and board diversity. Generally
speaking, corporations have justified voluntary affirmative action
within the firm only to the extent that it furthers their economic
interest.'" For instance, in 1999, participants at a forum sponsored by
the Conference Board, a nonprofit research association with over
1,400 member companies representing nearly half the Fortune 500,6
"immediately rejected the notion that board diversity for its own
sake, without a business case, was sufficient reason to act."" In other
words, corporate diversity is justified only if the economic benefits
exceed the economic costs to the corporation itself.
At a quick glance, the corporations' stances toward educational
diversity, on the one hand, and corporate diversity, on the other,
seem entirely consistent. Neither waxes poetic about social justice.
Both are forward-looking justifications, emphasizing a
consequentialist logic. Both are economic in nature-educational
diversity is good because it produces good inputs (employees with
cross-cultural competence and experience)"8 for the firm; corporate
the road for consequentialist rationales that emphasized the benefits of diversity, rather
than relying on arguments predicated on the need to rectify past (or even present) societal
discrimination.
13. See Fairfax, supra note 6, at 797 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330
(2003)).
14. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); see also Cynthia L. Estlund,
Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace,
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 20 (2005) (noting Justice O'Connor's citation to the
corporate briefs in the majority opinion); Arthur M. Wolfson, Note, Business Support of
Affirmative Action and Discriminatory Hiring Practices: Contradictory or Compatible?, 27
W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 197,203-04 (2005) (same).
15. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
16. See Our Community, CONFERENCE BD., http://www.conference-board.org/about/
index.cfm?id=1975 (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
17. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & D. JEANNE PATTERSON, CONFERENCE BD.,
BOARD DIVERSITY IN U.S. CORPORATIONS: BEST PRACTICES FOR BROADENING THE
PROFILE OF CORPORATE BOARDS 7 (1999); see also Fairfax, supra note 6, at 840 (noting
that "[w]hile surveys suggest that directors and corporate executives believe board
diversity to be an important goal, they also indicate their belief that rationales must go
beyond moral or social appeals").
18. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 89948
THE DIVERSITY DOUBLE STANDARD
diversity is good only to the extent that it furthers the firm's bottom
line. In sum, both are grounded in the empirical claim that "diversity
is good for business."19
But probing deeper, an intriguing distinction appears-what I
call a "diversity double standard." Regarding corporate diversity,
corporations are advocating nothing more than what is already in
their own economic self-interest. In other words, they will support
diversity in the workplace so long as it makes money. Seen in this
light, their position is morally indistinct from saying that they will
support a particular sparkplug supplier because it offers sparkplugs at
lower cost with equal quality. By contrast, when it comes to
educational diversity, corporations recommend it regardless of the
university's economic self-interest. In Part I, I demonstrate that this is
in fact a double standard. Of course, one could argue that it is just a
different standard, not deserving of the more pejorative "double
standard" label, because the corporation and university are in such
different circumstances. But as I demonstrate in Part II, these two
institutions are in a far more similar than different situation.2 0 In Part
III, I provide a possible explanation for why the double standard
exists, drawing on the psychology of human sociality in order to
explore how we generally think about the commercial and
educational realms. In the Conclusion, I offer some thoughts about
what to do with this double standard. In sum, if we critically examine
19. This Article does not address the hotly debated empirical question of whether
diversity improves corporate performance. For views on this empirical question, see James
A. Fanto, Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 901, 902 (2011) ("To our knowledge, the empirical studies to date have not
supported the case for board diversity on shareholder value grounds."); see also infra note
36 (discussing how proponents of diversity have used business rationales to advocate for
board diversity). See generally Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate Board Gender
Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89
N.C. L. REV. 809 (2011) (examining the relationship between female representation on
corporate boards and stock performance).
20. The title of Professor James E. Coleman, Jr.'s commentary unfairly suggests that I
am arguing that a different standard is "inherently" a double standard. James E. Coleman,
Jr., Different Strokes for Different Folks: A Different Standard Is Not Inherently a Double
Standard, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1003 (2011). For the record, I have never presumed that
anything is "inherently" a double standard. Instead, the entire Part II of my Article
explains why the corporate position on diversity is indeed a double standard and not
merely a different standard by exploring whether corporations and universities are, in fact,
differently situated. Regrettably, Professor Coleman never even addresses Part II (or, for
that matter, Part III) of my Article. See id. In his only attempt to justify the different
standard for universities and business corporations, Professor Coleman points out that
comparing universities and corporations is tantamount to "comparing apples and
oranges." Id. at 1007. Unfortunately, clichds aren't persuasive arguments. After all, one
could respond that apples and oranges are both fruits.
2011] 949
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the business case for diversity, we can discern an inconsistency that is
not easily justified. Moreover, this inconsistency suggests that
corporate America's public position on diversity is little more than a
commitment to diversity in the abstract so long as one never has to
pay for it.
I. THE DOUBLE STANDARD
A. The Corporate Stance on Educational Diversity
Both the amicus brief filed by sixty-five well-known corporations
("Sixty-five Businesses Brief") and the brief filed by General Motors
("GM Brief") make the same central argument in urging the Supreme
Court to uphold the affirmative action programs of the University of
Michigan College and Law School. They argue that the success of
American business in the face of global competition hinges on its
ability to recruit employees with "cross-cultural competence" and
experience.2 1 The Sixty-five Businesses Brief argues:
In the practical experience of the amici businesses, the need for
diversity in higher education is indeed compelling. Because our
population is diverse, and because of the increasingly global
reach of American business, the skills and training needed to
succeed in business today demand exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints. Employees at every
level of an organization must be able to work effectively with
people who are different from themselves. Amici need the
talent and creativity of a workforce that is as diverse as the
world around it.22
More specifically, the brief argues that individuals educated in a
"cross-cultural environment" are better able to problem solve, to
invent and market products and services appealing to various
consumers, to work with employees and business partners in the
United States and around the world, and to contribute to a
constructive, more racially harmonious work environment.' Tellingly,
the Sixty-five Businesses Brief sidesteps any social justice
justifications for diversity, whether framed in corrective justice terms
21. See Wilkins, supra note 4, at 1592 & n.183 (discussing the two briefs). Accordingly,
"the central argument of both briefs is the importance of producing leaders who have had
experience with diversity-not of producing leaders who are themselves diverse." Id.
22. Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 4, at 5-6.
23. Id. at 7.
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or based on the indignities of de facto segregation.24 Instead, the brief
squarely grounds its defense of educational affirmative action in the
pressing economic need for businesses to compete in an increasingly
global economic environment.'2
Likewise, the GM Brief affirms the business case for diversity.2 6
Citing market opportunities opened up by globalization, Internet
shopping, and the increasing purchasing power of racial minorities in
the United States, the GM Brief stresses the importance of having
employees with "cross-cultural competence":
Having high-level employees who possess cross-cultural
competence is essential for a business to profit from these vast
market opportunities. It is undeniable that consumers' cultures
can and often do influence their purchasing preferences.
Businesses whose employees are able to identify and cater to
these market preferences will prosper; those whose employees
lack the sensitivity and domain knowledge to meet these
diverse market demands will not.27
And, according to these briefs, not only is cross-cultural
competence essential to meeting these market challenges, universities
are apparently the best venues to teach this "skill":
Businesses depend upon institutions of higher learning to teach
students the cross-cultural competence and cognitive skills they
will need to perform at a high level in the business world.
Higher education is the best, and for many students the only,
opportunity to acquire these skills. 28
The implication is that corporations are, relatively speaking,
inferior venues for teaching cross-cultural competence. 21 The GM
24. See supra text accompanying note 10; see also Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 591-92 (2000) (contrasting "public-regarding" justifications for
diversity and the "self-regarding arguments proffered by the CEOs") (emphasis omitted);
Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63 (2003) (noting that the
desire to "remedy deep social dislocations associated with race" was the actual reason for
why affirmative action became prominent in American higher education).
25. See Sixty-five Businesses Brief, supra note 4, at 1; Wilkins, supra note 4, at 1553.
26. This is not to say that GM completely ignored other rationales for diversity. But
even when it referred to the indignities of a racial caste system, it still brought the issue
back to economics. For example, GM argued toward the end of its brief that "[tlhere can
be little doubt that racial and ethnic diversity in the senior leadership of the corporate
world is crucial to our Nation's economic prospects." GM Brief, supra note 4, at 23.
27. Id. at 13-14.
28. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
29. GM even made the argument in a subtitle of its brief. Id. ("Institutions of Higher
Learning Are Ideally Equipped to Provide the Exposure to Diversity, Development of
2011] 951
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Brief goes even beyond implication and makes the explicit
comparison regarding institutional competency: "[u]niversities, not
businesses, 'are [the] ideal institutions to foster' the skills and values
necessary for participation in a heterogeneous society."s0
In sum, corporations argue that universities should promote
diversity because it's good for business. But the business that they're
referring to is their business and not the business of universities.
Indeed, the corporate briefs do not make even a passing reference to
the economic self-interest of universities or, for that matter, any of
the significant costs that affirmative action programs generate for
universities.32 The strong implication is that, from the corporate
perspective, it simply doesn't matter whether diversity serves or
disserves the economic self-interest of universities. The possibility
that it might hurt the university's bottom line doesn't even register.
By contrast, corporations have justified voluntary affirmative
action within the firm only to the extent that it furthers their
Cross-Cultural Competence, and Critical Thinking Skills that Graduates Need to Thrive in
the Business World").
30. Id. at 21 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Expert Witness Report
of Patricia Y. Gurin at 9, Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-
75231)).
31. The main argument that Professor Coleman advances in his commentary is that
there can be no double standard where one party merely endorses a voluntary position
taken by another party. See generally Coleman, supra note 20. In other words, Professor
Coleman suggests that a double standard can only hold when one party forces a position
on the other. This is the only plausible reading of the myriad statements Professor
Coleman makes, stressing the voluntary nature of the University of Michigan's position in
Grutter and Gratz. See, e.g., id. at 1007 ("The University of Michigan was not being forced
to choose among competing interests in Grutter; rather, it was defending its right to pursue
diversity when it chose to do so.") (emphasis added); id. at 1009-10 ("Michigan was
seeking only the autonomy and discretion to pursue diversity; it was not being compelled to
do so against its will or interest.") (emphasis added); id. at 1004 ("There is nothing in this
position that can fairly be characterized as a diversity standard that ... the corporations
were trying to force on unwilling universities.") (emphasis added); id. at 1013-14 ("The
choice whether to sacrifice prestige for diversity-if such a choice was presented-was
made solely by the University of Michigan, which voluntarily pursued its affirmative action
program.") (emphasis added).
But Professor Coleman's principal argument is a non sequitur. The existence of
any double standard does not depend on the fact that one party is forcing a position on the
other. Suppose, for example, a man thinks that women are solely responsible for
preventing unwanted pregnancies and, therefore, women should actively use
contraceptives to prevent unwanted pregnancies. This same man is, however, completely
indifferent to male use of contraceptives. Is this a double standard? Yes it is. Does it
matter that this man is not legally or physically forcing women to use contraceptives? Of
course not. Urging women voluntarily to use contraceptives but declining to do so for men
amounts to a double standard unless this difference can be justified.
32. For a discussion of the costs for universities to maintain affirmative action policies,
see Part I.B.
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economic self-interest. For example, as noted in the Introduction, in
1999, Conference Board participants, including representatives from
companies such as Bank of America, PepsiCo, and TIAA-CREF,
expressly ruled out rationales, other than the "business case," to
support board diversity." Also, the Vice President of Global
Workforce Diversity of IBM Corp., in his public embrace of the
business case for workplace diversity, expressly noted that "[m]orality
yields goodwill, not good outcomes."' While others have not gone
quite so far in downplaying moral rationales," the mere fact that
corporations feel compelled to offer business justifications for their
voluntary efforts at diversity suggests that they regard moral
33. BRANCATO & PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 6-7; Fairfax, supra note 6, at 840.
34. Christine Canabou & Alison Overholt, Smart Steps, FAST COMPANY, Feb. 28,
2001, at 91, 108 (quoting J.T. (Ted) Childs, Jr.). Childs states:
My effort to diversify the workforce has moved from being a moral imperative
to being a strategic imperative-shifting the conversation away from affirmative
action and toward the marketplace. Morality yields goodwill, not good outcomes.
Ultimately promoting diversity is good for business.
I recently made this statement to government workers: "You're not the most
powerful influence on equal-opportunity enforcement-the marketplace is." I
want managers to be driven primarily by the fear of losing customers who won't
spend their money on a company with a reputation for unfair treatment. When
driven by the almighty dollar, executives will do what's right. Don't underestimate
the sound of "cha-ching."
Id.
35. Key leaders in the investment community have stressed business rationales for
diversity. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
POLICIES § 2.8(b) (2010), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%2OCorp%
20Gov%2OPolicies%2OFull%20and%20Current%204-13-10.pdf (noting that the Council
believes that a diverse board "can enhance corporate financial performance"); Lisa M.
Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855, 864-65 (2011) (giving examples of
companies that believe diversity improves performance); Jonathan D. Glater, Some
Companies Back Michigan in Affirmative Action Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at 1
(quoting an Exelon official: "They want to be able to have people from all backgrounds
who match and mirror the populations they serve. ... We believe they will be better
equipped to work in the global environment, in diverse communities, if they are educated
in an environment of diversity."); Gary Strauss, Good Old Boys' Network Still Rules
Corporate Boards, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at 1B (reporting Stephen Baum, CEO of
Sempra Energy, as stating that diversity "provides diversity of opinion and a different
perspective. It causes us to think a little more. The quality of our decision-making is
better. If we were all right-wing Republicans, we might miss opportunities."); Letter from
William M. Tartikoff, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Calvert Grp., Ltd. & Ivy
Wafford Duke, Assistant Vice President and Deputy Gen. Counsel, Calvert Grp., Ltd., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.calvert
group.com/NRC/literature/documents/sri-20100125-SEC-Proxy-Disclosure.pdf (noting
that "[djiversity is a critical attribute to a well functioning board" and that diversity "helps
to ensure that different perspectives are brought to bear on issues, while enhancing the
likelihood that proposed solutions will be nuanced and comprehensive").
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rationales as insufficient in and of themselves.36 The empirical
research of Lissa Broome, John Conley, and Kimberly Krawiec,
published in this issue, confirms that directors of public company
boards overwhelmingly rely on "functional" rationales that are
"loosely associated with corporate performance" to justify board
diversity.37 Rarely do they raise moral or social justice rationales.3 1
Interestingly, the authors found that when they pressed executives
about the claimed benefits of diversity,3 9 most struggled to come up
with specific and coherent examples.'
36. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 35, at 857 ("[B]oard diversity advocates have
gravitated toward market- or economic-based rationales for advancing board diversity.");
Fairfax, supra note 6, at 840 ("Thus, the very fact that scholars and business leaders alike
feel compelled to advance business justifications for board diversity indicates that moral
rationales may not be enough to encourage voluntary measures for increasing diversity.");
Thomas W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 351,
359 (2004) ("Arguing that corporations should embrace diversity because it makes good
business sense implies that if diversity does not increase the bottom line, it is unjustified-
indeed, that it should be avoided."). See supra note 35 for specific examples of companies
offering business justifications for diversity.
The reliance on business rationales for diversity may reflect, in part, a general
trend toward celebrating selfishness. See LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: How
GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 18-19 (2011) ("Today's experts often automatically
assume that the best way to change human behavior is to harness the force of greed by
using material incentives.... This approach reflects a long tradition in economic theory of
accepting, even celebrating, selfishness. Since at least the days of Adam Smith, economists
have preached that self-interest is noble and greed is good.").
37. Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories:
Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 761 (2011); see also id. at
763-64 ("We have identified six rationales posited in the literature or by our respondents
as business justifications for board diversity.").
38. Id. at 763, 799. To be sure, there are a few leaders who affirm the moral case for
corporate diversity. For example, one CEO of a major public company gave the following
explanation in a memo to middle management, to justify the company's decision to devote
significant resources to an affirmative action program:
"I am often asked why this is such a high priority at our company. There is, of
course, the obvious answer that it is in our best interest to seek out and employ
good people in all sectors of our society. And there is the answer that enlightened
self-interest tells us that more and more of the younger people, whom we must
attract as future employees, choose companies by their social records as much as
by their business prospects. But the one overriding reason for this emphasis is
because it is right. Because this company has always set for itself the objective of
assuming social as well as business obligations. Because that's the kind of company
we have been. And with your participation, that's the kind of company we'll
continue to be."
Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 53,
65 (1991) (quoting a CEO in Business Products Corporation-Part 1, HBS Case Services
9-377-077).
39. Professor Coleman argues that "the principal implication of [my] article" is "that
there is no credible business justification for meaningful corporate diversity." Coleman,
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One might wonder whether the lack of moral urgency for
supporting corporate diversity just reflects the fact that diversity is
thriving in corporate America. But that notion is quickly dispelled by
the data, which confirm that our workforce is still racially and
ethnically stratified. According to the 2008 statistics compiled by the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, although racial
minorities (including Asian Americans) 41 comprise approximately
34% of the workforce in the entire private sector, they constitute over
53% of unskilled laborers and about 50% of service workers, while
holding a mere 12% of senior level administrative and managerial
positions. 42 In 2008, twenty-two (or just over 2%) of the Fortune 1000
companies were headed by minority CEOs. 43 In 2005, at Fortune 500
supra note 20, at 1013. In other words, Professor Coleman thinks that my Article supports
the proposition that diversity is bad for the business of corporations (i.e., that diversity
impedes corporate performance). Professor Coleman's supposition is plainly false.
Whether diversity actually enhances or impedes corporate profitability is fiercely
contested and the complex empirical question is largely beside the point of my Article.
After all, as a logical matter, one need not answer the empirical question of whether
diversity is good for the business of corporations in order to argue that corporations apply
different standards for themselves as compared to universities. I am more interested in
why corporations employ disparate rationales to support educational and corporate
diversity (which I discuss in Part III) than whether the empirical evidence bears out those
rationales. Indeed, the empirical question of whether diversity enhances or impedes
corporate performance has been amplified by other scholars. See supra note 19.
40. See Broome et al., supra note 37, at 786-92. The one exception to this observation
is with regard to employee relations. Id. at 792-99.
41. The statistics use various classifications for race/ethnic identification: "White (not
of Hispanic origin)," "Black (not of Hispanic origin)," "Hispanic," "Asian or Pacific
Islander," and "American Indian or Alaskan Native." See Job Patterns for Minorities and
Women in Private Industry: A Glossary, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeol/glossary.cfm (last visited Feb.
22, 2011).
42. See 2008 EEO-1 National Aggregate Report, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeol/2008/us/national
.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). This table considers all groups other than White (not of
Hispanic origin) as "minorities."
The relevant EEOC reports (called "EEO-1 reports") are "collected annually
from private sector employers with 100 or more employees or federal contractors with
fifty [or] more employees. In 2008, over 68,300 employers with more than 62.2 million
employees filed EEO-1 reports." Job Patterns for Minorities and Women in Private
Industry (EEO-1), U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeol/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). The
statistics are found at: 2008 EEO-1 National Aggregate Report, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeol/
2008/us/national.html (last modified Mar. 11, 2009).
43. See People of Color in the U.S., CATALYST, INC., 5, http://www.catalyst.org
/file/318/qt people ofcolorus.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2009). This publication refers to
racial minorities as "people of color." As defined, "[p]eople of color include (but are not
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companies, 8.1% of corporate officer positions and just 5.1% of top
earner" positions were held by racial minorities.45 In 2008, 10% of the
S&P 1500 board seats were held by minorities.46 Further, as observed
by Lisa Fairfax, minority representation on Fortune 1000 corporate
boards "has remained virtually unchanged since 2003."47 These data
strongly suggest that minorities continue to inhabit mainly the lower
echelons of corporate hierarchies.
Objection: Taking Words Too Seriously. One might object that
I'm taking words far too seriously. On this view, amicus briefs are
simply public relations vehicles that don't reflect any moral or policy
commitment to anything. And the detailed doctrinal arguments
therein might merely reflect the elite appellate law firm strategy of
counting the noses of nine Supreme Court Justices in light of existing
precedent (e.g., Bakke).48 While certainly possible, this account seems
too cynical.49
First, it's tough to believe that the arguments in the amicus briefs
are attributable solely to the outside law firms. It's not as if law firms
were obsessively fixated on the business case for diversity. With a
single exception,s0 amongst the GrutterlGratz amicus briefs, no law
limited to) African Americans/Black people, Asian-Americans/Asians, Latinos/Hispanics,
and Native Americans." Id.
44. The definition of "top earner" used by Catalyst-a leading nonprofit membership
organization devoted to expanding opportunities for women and business-seems to track
the definition of "named executive officers" that public companies are required to disclose
in their public periodic filings pursuant to SEC regulations. See CATALYST, 2005
CATALYST CENSUS OF WOMEN CORPORATE OFFICERS AND TOP EARNERS OF THE
FORTUNE 500, at 1 (2006), available at http://www.catalyst.org/publication/263/2005-
catalyst-census-of-women-corporate-officers-and-top-earners-of-the-fortune-500 (defining
"top earner" by reference to the public filing requirements).
45. See People of Color in the U.S., supra note 43, at 4 ("[Wjomen of color held 1.7%
of corporate officer positions. Men of color held 6.4% of all corporate officer positions.
Women of color held just 1.0% of all top earner positions ... [while] [m]en of color held
4.1% of all top earner positions.").
46. Board Practices: Trends in Board Structure at S&P 1,500 Companies,
RISKMETRICS GROUP, INC., 1 (Dec. 17, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
47. Fairfax, supra note 35, at 867 (citation omitted).
48. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
49. For an argument "that corporate rhetoric has a stronger connection to corporate
behavior than most [people] would presume," see Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done?
A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV.
771, 771 (2007).
50. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Boston Bar Ass'n et al. in Support of Respondents at
8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at http://www.boston
bar.org/pp/amicus/grutter -v..bollinger.pdf (arguing that law firms desire diverse attorneys
to "effectively attract and retain an increasingly diverse and global client base").
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firm or bar association signed on to the business case for diversity."'
Indeed, the American Bar Association failed to even mention the
business case for diversity in its own brief. Rather, it grounded its
support of affirmative action at universities based on the need to
maintain the legitimacy of our justice system through full minority
participation in our legal institutions.52 Also, news reports suggest that
the corporate amici carefully scrutinized the final version of the briefs
before committing to signing them,53 which is consistent with how
corporate legal departments generally handle their litigation matters.
Second, as noted above, the empirical research of Broome et al.
shows that corporate executives overwhelmingly prefer business
rationales to justify board or workplace diversity.54 This finding is not
surprising because the business case for diversity is rhetorically
consistent with the prevailing theory of corporate purpose-
maximizing shareholder value.5 Thus, we see a perfect alignment
between their private admissions and their public pronouncements.
Third, as I explain below in Part III, it's entirely psychologically
predictable that corporations would invoke a self-regarding stance
within the corporate domain and an other-regarding stance within the
educational domain.56 In the end, there are good reasons to think that
51. As David Wilkins observed, "[n]o other bar organization or collection of law firms
filed a brief arguing that upholding affirmative action was vital to the corporate bar's
ability to compete in the global economy-a situation made all the more remarkable by
the fact that one of the cases directly addressed the issue of diversity in legal education."
Wilkins, supra note 4, at 1598 (citation omitted).
52. See Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 7-17, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); see also Wilkins, supra note
4, at 1598.
53. See Glater, supra note 35 (noting, based on the report of law firms representing
these corporations, that "some companies do not want to commit themselves until they see
the final version [of the amicus briefs]").
54. Broome et al., supra note 37, at 800.
55. Id. (noting that the prevalence of business rationales in respondents' narratives "is
not particularly surprising, given the dominance of the shareholder-value theory of the
corporation in this country"); cf infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (describing the
potential relationship between corporate giving and profit-seeking motivations).
56. Professor Coleman asserts that the "major flaw in [my] argument is [my]
assumption that this [corporate] position intentionally ignores the economic impact of
diversity on universities." Coleman, supra note 20, at 1009 (emphasis added). As evidence,
he quotes my statement that: "The possibility that [meaningful affirmative action
programs] might hurt the university's bottom line doesn't even register." Id. Frankly, it's
quite a stretch to go from my "it doesn't even register" to his "[corporations are]
intentionally ignor[ing] the economic impact of diversity on universities." Id. (emphasis
added). Indeed, I don't actually argue that the corporate disregard of the economic impact
to universities is fully conscious and intentional. In fact, in Part III, in explaining why
corporations might ignore the economic self-interest of universities, I rely on psychological
studies that describe psychological processes that are, for the most part, unconscious and
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the positions staked out in the amicus briefs do in fact reflect the
corporate mindset, which in turn reveals a double standard. If I'm
mistaken, then corporations would be guilty of something arguably
worse.57
B. The Economic Cost to the University
The double standard I've identified is this: on the one hand,
corporations call for diversity in the workplace if and only if it serves
their self-interest; on the other hand, corporations call for diversity at
universities even if it cuts against universities' self-interest. At this
point, one might counter that this is not really a double standard
because university affirmative action programs generate trivial costs
to universities and, alternatively, even if those costs are nontrivial,
they are still outweighed by the economic benefits derived from these
programs. In other words, the objection is that there is no double
standard because the promotion of educational diversity is entirely
consistent with the economic self-interest of universities; to wit, there
is no trade-off between the economic self-interest of universities and
the pursuit of meaningful educational diversity. Setting aside the
important normative question of whether universities should actively
pursue diversity regardless of the costs, 8 as a purely descriptive
automatic (rather than controlled and intentional). See infra note 216. Moreover,
Professor Coleman never explains why the intentionality of the corporate positions even
matters. After all, double standards have long endured without self-reflectiveness. Indeed,
that may be one of the reasons why double standards persist.
57. See, e.g., Patrick S. Shin & G. Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1017, 1019 (2011) (exploring the problematic normative implications of showcasing female
and minority board members as a "signal of a socially upstanding corporation").
58. The normative issue of whether universities should or should not actively pursue
diversity regardless of the economic costs is an important issue, but it is one that is not
germane to the purely descriptive issue of whether the promotion of meaningful diversity
does in fact generate significant economic costs to universities, which is the only issue that
is being addressed in this Part I.B. In this Part, I am only answering a likely objection that
(1) there is no double standard in the corporate positions on educational and corporate
diversity because university affirmative action programs generate trivial costs to
universities and, (2) alternatively, even if those costs are nontrivial, they are still
outweighed by the economic benefits derived from these programs. Indeed, my Article is
not mainly concerned about universities' normative positions on educational diversity but,
rather, corporations' normative positions on both educational and corporate diversity.
But, for the record, I think that the long-term economic and noneconomic costs to society
of not adopting meaningful affirmative action in universities significantly outweighs any
economic costs that must be borne directly by universities. Moreover, racial justice
requires that we, as a society, pursue both educational and corporate diversity. See infra
note 136 (defining "racial justice"). My explicit position supporting both educational and
corporate diversity, regardless of the economic costs to either institutions, is a far cry from
the "damning indictment of educational diversity" that Professor Coleman accuses me of
delivering. Coleman, supra note 20, at 1010.
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matter, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that meaningful"
affirmative action programs that admit more than token numbers of
underrepresented minorities (including Latinos, African Americans,
and American Indians)? generate more economic costs than
economic benefits to universities.' Here's why.
1. Decreased Revenues
First, meaningful affirmative action programs may negatively
impact the university's prestige standing, which in turn may hamper
the ability of universities to charge premium tuitions and attract
alumni donations. Because nonprofit universities cannot raise equity
capital to fund their operations, they must rely on monetary resources
generated from two types of patrons-students and alumni. Students
are effectively "customers" of the university who pay for the
university's services (education) through their tuitions. Alumni, on
the other hand, are past customers and current donors of the
universities. Whether these student and alumni patrons will pay, and
how much, is in large part a function of the university's prestige,62 the
59. When I speak of "meaningful" affirmative action programs or "meaningful"
diversity, I don't have a precise definition but am generally referring to policies that seek
to create a "critical mass" of underrepresented minorities. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 316 (2003). Perhaps a useful reference point is the testimony of Erica Munzel,
the admissions director of the University of Michigan Law School, who testified that she
understood a "critical mass" to mean a "number that encourages underrepresented
minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated." Id. at 318.
60. For purposes of this Article, when I refer to "underrepresented minorities," I am
referring to those minority groups historically underrepresented in university admissions.
A useful reference point is the University of Michigan Law School's admissions process,
which gave special consideration to certain minority groups but not others. See id. at 316
(noting "the Law School's longstanding commitment to 'one particular type of diversity,'
that is, 'racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like African Americans,
Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented
in our student body in meaningful numbers.' ") (citation omitted).
61. Cf Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1797-1802 (2003) (noting the transaction costs associated
with a heterogeneous workforce and that such costs may not be recouped in the near
term); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder
Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 680 n.24 (2006) (describing the
argument that "diversity beyond mere tokenism may entail significant costs without any
reciprocal benefit"); Joo, supra note 36, at 363 ("In some situations racial justice will harm
corporate profitability: antidiscrimination or affirmative action regulations may impose
compliance costs, and lawsuits by employees or customers may result in adverse
judgments or settlements.").
62. To be sure, the process is significantly more complex than what I have described
in the main text. As noted by Roger Geiger:
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"coin of the realm in higher education."63 But prestige is an intangible
quality and thus can be difficult to assess.' So, how can students and
alumni reliably measure a university's prestige?
Assessing prestige has, for better or worse, become easier with
the advent of institutional rankings published by U.S. News & World
Report ("U.S. News" or "U.S. News rankings")." Originally published
in 1983, the U.S. News rankings began to incorporate actuarial data in
1989.66 These rankings produce clear and precise indicators of relative
status67 (regardless of their actual merits), which have come to be
strongly associated with prestige, albeit not without tremendous
The behavior of universities is frequently described as competition for prestige to
achieve or maintain status. This process is ambiguous, to say the least. Prestige is
both the cause and the result of getting or having good students, good faculty, and
ample financial support. This situation is most confusing in the case of students,
who are both consumers demanding the product and inputs to the quality of the
product. In addition, higher education markets are highly segmented-by student
abilities, cultural preferences, and academic programs. The higher education
market in fact is a segmented hierarchy, in which head-to-head competition occurs
chiefly among roughly comparable institutions. Still, near the top, recognized
national markets exist for students, faculty, and research support.
Roger L. Geiger, The Competition for High-Ability Students: Universities in a Key
Marketplace, in THE FUTURE OF THE CITY OF INTELLECT: THE CHANGING AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY 82,84 (Steven Brint ed., 2002) (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 87. For further discussion of prestige, see also DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES
IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 159 (2003)
("[Universities'] most comprehensive objective, however, is academic distinction, or
prestige-an elusive concept that embraces the quality of the students and the scholarly
and scientific reputations of the faculty."); DAVID A. GARVIN, THE ECONOMICS OF
UNIVERSITY BEHAVIOR 22-24 (1980) (arguing that universities are, in part, prestige-
maximizing organizations); infra notes 171-200 (discussing the commercialization of
American universities).
64. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 63, at 159; Patricia M. McDonough et al., College
Rankings: Democratized College Knowledge for Whom?, 39 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 513, 515
(1998) (describing the services offered by organizations, such as the university, as
intangible "credence goods," which "hinge on the reputation of the organization").
65. See Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://www.usnews.com/rankings (last
visited Feb. 22, 2011); see also BOK, supra note 63, at 159 (discussing the prestige
expressed by rankings); Geiger, supra note 62, at 87 (discussing the effect of declining
rankings); McDonough et al., supra note 64, at 515-16 (highlighting the critical role of
rankings for consumers in reducing uncertainty about product quality).
66. Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti-
Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1105 (2009). The first law school
rankings were published in 1987. Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Strength in
Numbers? The Advantages of Multiple Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 205, 208 (2006).
67. See Wendy Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Diversity, 18 S. CAL. REV.
L. & SOC. JUST. 587, 596 (2009) ("[Tlhe evidence remains conclusive that rankings, in
producing clear, precise indicators of relative status, have changed how students assess the
quality of law schools, and this is reflected in their decisions about which law school to
attend") (emphasis omitted).
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controversy.' To illustrate vividly how the U.S. News rankings can
influence a school applicant's evaluation of the school's status,
sociologists Wendy Espeland and Michael Sauder reported on how
one informant went about deciding which law school to attend:
[Sam] applied mostly to "good schools" in New York and
California. He applied to and was accepted by several schools
in the Midwest and South, schools he "wasn't excited about,"
but only applied because they offered him fee waivers. Sam
says he would not have gone to these schools unless he was
offered a "really good deal, lots of scholarship money." He
described these schools as "not all that prestigious and not in
desirable locations." And prestige is important to Sam because
it is important to the [legal] profession: "The prestige of your
law school really does give you some capital later in your
career. At every stage of your career, where you went to law
school might help you in some way." When asked how he
defined whether or not a school is prestigious, Sam quickly
replies: "U.S. News and World Report. It's the only way to
go." 69
The reality is that Sam's decision making is representative of
many applicants to higher educational institutions70 that are subject to
68. For views supportive of rankings, see, for example, Mitchell Berger, Why the U.S.
News and World Report Law School Rankings Are Both Useful and Important, 51 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 487, 500 (2001) ("The U.S. News rankings serve an important and valuable
function for students and help promote accountability among law school[s]."); Russell
Korobkin, Harnessing the Positive Power of Rankings: A Response to Posner and Sunstein,
81 IND. L.J. 35, 45 (2006) [hereinafter Korobkin, Harnessing] ("Rankings have inherent
value to students who use them for coordination purposes and therefore to institutions
that compete for students."); Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings:
Solutions to Coordination and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEx. L. REV. 403, 411-14
(1998); Richard Schmalbeck, The Durability of Law School Reputation, 48 J. LEGAL
EDuC. 568, 586 (1998) (arguing that law school reputations are relatively durable and that
rankings have had little effect on reputations).
For views critical of rankings, see, for example, Michael Sauder & Ryon
Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News and World Report Rankings on
the Admission Process of Law Schools, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 105, 105 (2006) ("[Tlhe
rankings help create rather than simply reflect differences among law schools through the
magnification of the small, and statistically random, distinctions produced by the
measurement apparatus."); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School
Rankings, Reputations, and Resource Allocations: Ways Rankings Mislead, 82 IND. L.J.
229, 230 (2006) ("discuss[ing] problems created by the annual rankings of law schools").
For a criticism of Schmalbeck's thesis that rankings have little effect on law school
reputations, see Sauder & Lancaster, supra, at 117 (criticizing Schmalbeck for failing to
"address the effects of rankings on external constituencies").
69. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 594.
70. See, e.g., Michael N. Bastedo & Nicholas A. Bowman, College Rankings as an
Interorganizational Dependency: Establishing the Foundation for Strategic and Institutional
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the virtual monopoly of the U.S. News rankings system.71 In fact,
quantitative analyses of admissions trends at colleges and law schools
conclusively demonstrate that rankings influence how many
applications a school receives, the academic characteristics of the
school's applicant pool, the percentage of applicants who are
accepted, and the percentage of accepted students who then
matriculate.7 2 As a result, rankings have become "signals-observable
Accounts, 52 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 3, 4 (2011) (noting that "[p]rior studies have found that
rankings have a strong influence on students as they make choices to enroll at research
universities" and citing studies). To be sure, not every student places great importance on
rankings in choosing their school. That said, the relatively scant research on student
profiles suggests that rankings are heavily relied on by "high-socioeconomic-status, high-
achieving students who attend highly competitive post-secondary institutions and are
focused on colleges that will both provide them with a good liberal education but that will
also position them well for graduate school and professional opportunities." McDonough
et al., supra note 64, at 529-30. Since these particular students are likely to act in a more
systematic and predictable fashion, their actions are likely to impact the rankings. (A
useful analogy might be the mechanism by which the trades of sophisticated investors are
likely to impact the prices of securities according to the Efficient Capital Markets
Hypothesis.) McDonough et al. describe these students' characteristics:
[T]he top student and institutional characteristics associated with the use of
newsmagazine rankings in choosing a college are students who are focused on the
college's academic reputation; high-achieving students; students who seek advice
from their teachers, school, and private counselors in making their college choices;
students attending public universities; students motivated to choose their college
because of a liberal education ideal; students attending more selective colleges and
universities; and high-income students.
Id. at 529. It should be noted that the profile of students who rely on rankings may be
broader today than when McDonough et al. published their research in 1998. At the time
McDonough et al. conducted their surveys, the Internet had not penetrated deeply into
our society and thus students often had no choice but to pay six dollars for the hard copy
of the relevant U.S. News issue. Id. at 530 (noting that "low-SES students are probably not
even using a $6 magazine"). Today, however, most students have costless access to the
U.S. News rankings, albeit perhaps not the most recently released reports.
71. Although most of my research on the impact of rankings has been confined to
colleges and law schools, my arguments should also hold for universities and other
graduate/professional schools that are subject to the virtual monopoly of the U.S. News
rankings system. To be sure, U.S. News does not enjoy a virtual monopoly in all fields. For
example, rankings for business schools are much more dispersed with multiple influential
rankers employing different criteria. See Sauder & Espeland, supra note 66, at 206.
Therefore, my arguments are less applicable to those schools not subject to the virtual
monopoly of U.S. News.
72. See James Monks & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, U.S. News & World Report's College
Rankings: Why They Do Matter, CHANGE, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 42, 45, 49 (concluding,
based on a quantitative analysis of thirty private colleges and universities over an eleven
year period, that detrimental ranking movements lead schools to "accept a greater
percentage of their applicants (an increase in its admit rate)" in response to their shrinking
applicant pools, resulting in smaller percentages of the admitted applicants matriculating
(a decrease in yield rate), and resulting in lower average SAT scores of their incoming
freshman classes); Sauder & Lancaster, supra note 68, at 127-28 (finding that, based on a
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indicators such as price"-of a school's selectivity." Thus, the higher
the institution's U.S. News rank, the more likely it will attract students
with higher academic credentials and the more difficult it will be to
gain admission.7 4 As noted by Lani Guinier, "U.S. News & World
Report is undoubtedly the most influential voice in judging who 'wins'
and 'loses' in the contest for elite status.""
Having established that the abstract concept of prestige has been
de facto operationalized into the U.S. News rankings, I now inquire
about the relationship between diversity policies and these rankings.
The empirical literature suggests that a university's efforts at
promoting racial and ethnic diversity beyond mere tokenism may be
at cross-purposes with maintaining or increasing rankings.
Admissions officers attest that the rankings have stepped up
pressures to raise standardized test scores,76 which can hinder
diversity goals. Despite the onslaught of academic criticism against
the overreliance on high-stakes standardized tests like the SAT or
quantitative analysis of ten years of law school data, "[i]ndependent of school
characteristics, ... [U.S. News] ranks affect how many students apply to a school, how
many of those applicants have exceptionally high LSAT scores, the percentage of
applicants who are accepted, and the percentage of accepted students who matriculate").
Other studies employing qualitative methodologies and/or studying the effect of
other influential rankings systems nonetheless confirm that rankings are highly influential.
See, e.g., MITCHELL L. STEVENS, CREATING A CLASS: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE
EDUCATION OF ELITES 240 (2007) (quoting an admissions officer at a selective liberal arts
college: "People will tell us, 'Oh, you guys were the best in Admissions, your publications
are great, the people were so nice, loved the campus, and I'm going somewhere else.' It's
like whatever we do, kids will still choose to go to the most highly rated school they can
get into."); Kimberly D. Elsbach & Roderick M. Kramer, Members' Responses to
Organizational Identity Threats: Encountering and Countering the Business Week
Rankings, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 442, 464-65 (1996) (finding that "many business school
members perceived the Business Week rankings as a threat to their organization's
identity," which resulted in tactics to restore their institutional identity).
73. Sauder & Lancaster, supra note 68, at 106.
74. See Korobkin, Harnessing, supra note 68, at 41-42 (arguing that since legal
education has a "significant status component," "[t]he best way for a student to signal his
high quality ... is to matriculate at a school where only high-quality students can gain
admission").
75. Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 144 n.126 (2003); see also BOK, supra note 63,
at 159-60 ("Although the unreliability of [U.S. News'] ratings is notorious, they continue
to have an influence, since nothing else has been devised that provides such regular,
seemingly exact measures of comparative academic quality.").
76. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 598 (making this point with respect to the
LSAT); Sauder & Lancaster, supra note 68, at 110 (noting that rankings have generated "a
much greater emphasis on LSAT scores in the [law school] admissions process"); West-
Faulcon, supra note 66, at 1107 (making this point with respect to the SAT).
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LSAT in the admissions process,n scores generated from these tests
remain a significant factor in determining the institution's selectivity
which is then used to compute its overall rank.7
While the specific algorithm is periodically revised at the
discretion of U.S. News," for the 2010 National Universities and
Liberal Arts College rankings, which were published online on
August 19, 2009, a college's average SAT score was given an explicit
weight of half of the student selectivity score (which is one of seven
general factors) 0 and 7.5% of the composite score, which is then
scaled to compute the school's overall rank." For law school rankings,
although U.S. News publishes test scores at the twenty-fifth and
seventy-fifth percentiles, it uses the median LSAT score," which
counts for half of the student selectivity score (which is one of four
general factors) and 12.5% of the composite score.' This (12.5%)
77. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & SUSAN STURM, WHO'S QUALIFIED? 7-14 (2001)
(critiquing "testocracy"); PETER SACKS, STANDARDIZED MINDS: THE HIGH PRICE OF
AMERICA'S TESTING CULTURE AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO CHANGE IT passim (1999);
Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future ofAffirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative
Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 971 (1996) (noting that the SAT correlates poorly with
freshman grades); West-Faulcon, supra note 66, at 1106 (summarizing critiques); Jacques
Steinberg, Challenge Revives SAT Test Debates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at A14
(describing former University of California President's recommendation that the
University of California school system eliminate the SAT as a requirement).
78. Guinier, supra note 75, at 145-55; West-Faulcon, supra note 66, at 1105.
79. West-Faulcon, supra note 66, at 1105.
80. The average SAT score carries the greatest weight of all subfactors used to
compute the student selectivity of the entering class. See Robert Morse, Methodology:
Undergraduate Ranking Criteria and Weights, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/best-colleges/2010/08/17/methodology-
undergraduate-ranking-criteria-and-weights-2011.html. The seven general factors
considered to compute the composite score are peer assessment (22.5%), student
selectivity (15%), faculty resources (20%), graduation and retention rates (20%), financial
resources (10%), alumni giving (5%), and graduation rate performance (7.5%). Id.
81. Id.
82. For a period, U.S. News relied on a combination of the twenty-fifth and seventy-
fifth percentiles, instead of the median, but it went back to using the median LSAT score.
See Carl Bialik, Small Change by U.S. News Leads to New Controversy in Rankings,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Apr. 7, 2005), http://online.wsj.com/article/0 SB1112799370069996
40,00.html#.
83. The four general factors considered to compute the composite score are: quality
(40%), selectivity (25%), placement (20%), and faculty resources (15%). See Robert
Morse, The Law School Rankings Methodology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 15,
2010), http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/best-law-schools/2010/04/15/the-law-
school-rankings-methodology.html?PageNr=1.
84. Law school rankings are computed based on four general factors: reputation
(referred to by U.S. News as "quality assessment"), selectivity, placement success, and
faculty resources. See id. Each factor is comprised of several weighted subfactors to create
a composite score which is then scaled to compute the overall school rank. See id.;
Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 593.
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doesn't sound like much until one considers that the weight given to
the undergraduate grade point average ("UGPA") is even less-only
10% of the overall rank."
More importantly, for both college and law school admissions,
standardized test scores appear to have a greater impact on an
institution's ranking than the explicit formula would suggest 6 and a
greater impact than other more highly weighted criteria.87 For
example, economist Thomas Webster concluded, based on his
principal component regression analysis of national universities, that
when one explicitly considers the effects of pervasive
multicollinearity, the institutional average SAT score would rank first
as "the most significant ranking criterion."" Senior RAND
researchers, Stephen Klein and Laura Hamilton, came to similar
findings in their report, which was commissioned by the Association
of American Law Schools.89 They found that ninety percent of the
overall differences in ranks could be explained solely based on
student selectivity, of which the entering class's median LSAT score is
the "major driver."" In conclusion, Klein and Hamilton note that
"ranking schools on LSAT alone will do a very good job of replicating
the overall ranks U.S. News publishes."9 1 As observed by Alex
Johnson, a former law school dean who has held numerous positions
85. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 593.
86. West-Faulcon, supra note 66, at 1106-07 ("There is strong anecdotal and empirical
evidence that the real-world impact of a university's average SAT score on its U.S. News
ranking is significantly greater than the explicit formula weight reported by U.S. News to
calculate rankings.") (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 1107.
88. Thomas J. Webster, A Principal Component Analysis of the U.S. News & World
Report Tier Rankings of Colleges and Universities, 20 ECON. EDUC. REV. 235, 243 (2001).
Multicollinearity "refers to the degree to which changes in the value of one or more of the
ranking criteria are related to, and are affected by, changes in one or more of the other
ranking criteria." Id. at 236.
89. Stephen P. Klein & Laura Hamilton, The Validity of the U.S. News and World
Report Ranking of ABA Law Schools, ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHS. (Feb. 18, 1998),
http://www.aals.org/reports/validity.html.
90. Id. Klein and Hamilton note that although the median LSAT score constitutes
only fifty percent of the student selectivity rating, it has a greater impact of "about 70%"
of the selectivity score because U.S. News failed to control for differences in standard
deviations among the components before weighting them. Id. The student selectivity
rating constitutes 25% of the school's overall rating and is made up of the following
components: median LSAT score (50% of student selectivity), UGPA (40%), and
rejection rate (10%). Id. Klein and Hamilton note that when differences in standard
deviations are controlled for, "the overall selectivity rank at several schools differed by
several places from the way US News ranked them" and that "[t]hese differences were
enough to move some schools between 'tiers' in the US News system." Id.
91. Id.
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(including chair of the Board of Trustees) in the organization that
administers the LSAT 92:
Over the last three years, there is no law school with a higher
ranking than another law school with a lower median LSAT in
the ranking of the top 50 law schools. Although this is one of
the objective indices used to evaluate and form subjective
judgments about these schools, it is quite shocking to see that
none of these other so-called variables are apparently
important enough or weighted heavily enough to cause a school
which is superior in all other respects to be ranked higher than
a law school with a higher median LSAT.93
Reliance on average or median test scores might not be as
controversial but for the established fact that some groups perform
worse on standardized tests than other groups.94 For example, as
noted by two sociologists studying the impact on U.S. News rankings
on law school affirmative action policies:
Generally (and it is crucial to emphasize these patterns are
measures of central tendency that necessarily obscure
variation), men score higher than women, whites and Asian
Americans do better than African Americans, Mexican
Americans and Puerto Ricans, and people living in the
Northeast do better than those from the South. Studies have
also found persistent class effects in standardized testing where
students from wealthy or middle-class families do better than
those from working-class or poor families.95
92. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The
Pernicious Effects of Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 309, 309 (2006) (star footnote). Johnson noted
that he was "a volunteer" in all positions held at the Law School Admission Council, the
"non-profit entity that produces the LSAT." Id.
93. Id. at 311 n.14.
94. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 599.
95. Id.; see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-20, HIGHER
EDUCATION: ISSUES RELATED TO LAW SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS app. at 29-30 (2009)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http:/www.gao.gov/new.items/d1020.pdf ("Lower
Average LSAT Scores and Undergraduate GPAs May Have Negatively Affected Some
African Americans and Hispanics"); STEVENS, supra note 72, at 165 ("While average SAT
scores tests have risen for all students over the years, aggregate scores for whites and
Asians are consistently the highest. The racial disparities are most pronounced on the
SAT math test .... "); Johnson, supra note 92, at 311 ("[M]embers of underrepresented
groups-African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Puerto Ricans-score
below that of similarly situated white and Asian-American test-takers.").
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Although the causes of such disparities in test scores are
complex, 6  the research is clear that non-token admission of
underrepresented minorities cannot be accomplished unless
admissions officers rely on criteria other than standardized test
scores.9 7 Further, meaningful racial/ethnic diversity is not achievable
at most selective colleges and universities unless race and ethnicity
are explicitly considered in admissions decisions.98 And use of other
nonracial criteria, e.g., low family income, in lieu of race will often not
96. See GAO REPORT, supra note 95, app. at 31-33 (citing factors); STEVENS, supra
note 72, at 164-65 (citing the "long history of residential segregation by race" and its
impact on accumulated property wealth as one of the factors contributing to the pattern of
racial disadvantage on measures of college readiness, including SAT scores); Espeland &
Sauder, supra note 67, at 600 (listing possible explanations for the "test gap"); Jerry Kang
& Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative
Action," 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1087-90 (2006) (summarizing stereotype threat
literature); Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 806 (1995)
(showing that the representation of "a difficult test as diagnostic of ability can undermine
the performance of Black participants, and that it can cause in them a distinct sense of
being under threat of judgment by racial stereotype").
97. With respect to racial/ethnic disparities in particular, see ANTHONY P.
CARNEVALE & STEPHEN J. ROSE, CENTURY FOUND., SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS,
RACE[ETHNICITY, AND SELECTIVE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 44, 47 (2003), available at
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/Education/carnevale-rose.pdf (simulating the effects of an
admissions model based solely on the "most easily quantifiable measures, including
grades, college entrance exams scores, teacher recommendation, and participation and
leadership in extracurricular activities" and concluding that there would be a
"considerable drop"-from 12% to 4%-in the total number of black and Hispanic
students enrolled at the 146 most selective colleges); Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda,
Diversity, Opportunity, and the Shifting Meritocracy in Higher Education, 72 AM. SOC.
REV. 487, 507 (2007) ("Our [statistical and natural experiment] analyses demonstrate that
the emergence of a test-score meritocracy amid pervasive test-score gaps required
selective institutions to give underrepresented minorities an admission boost to achieve
campus diversity."); Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 601 ("Research is clear on this
point: in law school admissions and more broadly in admissions to selective colleges and
graduate and professional programs, non-token representation of groups like African
American, non-white Hispanic, Native Americans, and students from poor or lower
middle class families, cannot be accomplished apart from considerations of criteria other
than test scores and undergraduate grade averages."); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to
Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning
Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15, 19 (1997)
(concluding that an admissions process that relies solely on the LSAT and UGPA would
result in a sharp decrease of underrepresented minorities being admitted).
98. This conclusion is borne out by the actual experiences of public universities who
have been barred from using race-conscious admissions criteria. See West-Faulcon, supra
note 66, at 1086 (noting the dramatic decline of African American and Latino admissions
"to pre-Civil Rights Era lows" as a result of the elimination of affirmative action in those
public universities whose states have passed laws prohibiting racial preferences); id. at
1093-95 (detailing the impact of eliminating affirmative action on African American and
Latino admissions and enrollment).
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generate the desired numbers of minorities.99 Consequently,
affirmative action programs that seek to meaningfully expand the
numbers of underrepresented minority groups are at cross-purposes
with a university's ongoing attempts to increase its prestige standing,
driven primarily by standardized test scores, as represented by its U.S.
News ranking.100
Qualitative evidence provides further support of the tension
between school prestige and diversity. Sociological interviews of 165
law school administrators, faculty, and staff involved in the
admissions process' 0' reveal that the rankings have sharpened the
emphasis on students' LSAT profiles, which has impeded their efforts
to craft a racially (as well as economically) diverse class of students.'0 2
As one respondent put it:
"The most pernicious change [due to the rankings] is that I
know a lot of schools who have become so driven by their
LSAT profile that they've reduced the access of people who are
non-traditional students. . . . Particularly, the higher echelon
you are, the more worried you are that if you let your student
numbers slide to reflect your commitment to diversity, you're
going to be punished in the polls for that."10 3
99. As explained by Carnevale and Rose, "While African Americans and Hispanics
are disproportionately from low-[socio-economic status (SES)] families, low-SES families
are disproportionately White." CARNEVALE & ROSE, supra note 97, at 59. Accordingly,
[t]he qualified pool of low-SES students increases the number of qualified African
Americans and Hispanics compared to current enrollments, but not their share of
the qualified pool. Hence, income-based policies are not [an] effective substitute
for racial and ethnic enrollment goals, unless low-income African Americans and
Hispanics can be chosen disproportionately from the qualified pool of low-SES
students or chosen as a supplement to the middle- and upper-income African
Americans and Hispanics currently enrolled.
Id. at 59-60.
100. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 599 ("The greater the emphasis on test
scores, the more costly it seems to admit racially and economically diverse students.");
Johnson, supra note 92, at 311 (concluding that the "use of the U.S. News rankings, which
relies heavily on objective actuarial data-including the school's median Law School
Admission Test (LSAT) score-to form a subjective judgment of school quality, is
inimical to the stated goal of achieving diversity in law schools and must be eliminated if
we are to achieve diversity in our law schools"); Sturm & Guinier, supra note 77, at 992
("[R]eliance on [current methods] for determining merit screens out a disproportionate
number of . . . people of color who apply for positions."); West-Faulcon, supra note 66, at
1103-20 (detailing the relationship between rankings, institutional average SAT scores,
and racial diversity).
101. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 594.
102. Id. at 597-601.
103. Id. at 597-98 (quoting a study respondent). As another law school dean put it:
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Administrators report feeling "forced to choose between a
higher median LSAT score and a more diverse student body."" An
administrator and law professor observed:
"The [rankings] induce some constituencies-particularly the
faculty-to be very anxious, to focus admissions on students
with high LSAT scores. That's probably the single most
pernicious consequence of the [U.S. News] survey. It puts
enormous pressure on law schools to become homogeneous and
to all compete for the same students.""os
Even those administrators who insist that rankings will not alter
their admissions objectives admit that they must pay a price in terms
of their rank.'06 As one dean said:
"I say to the entering class that we are proud to be in the
bottom quartile and that it's because we take chances on
students and it's because our students go out and do work in
public service, and so our salaries are low and our numbers are
not high and that is what our mission is and that is what it
should be. And if we ever got out of the fourth tier, I would be
nervous; I would think that we were doing something wrong."107
By incentivizing schools to rely more on test scores in setting
admissions criteria, rankings make it riskier for schools that want to
maintain or enhance their prestige standing to admit significant
numbers of underrepresented minorities. 08
"I think the rankings push you to give less weight to an applicant who has done
something really interesting if they don't have good LSAT numbers. So that might
make for a less interesting class. ... There is pressure to take people who've got
good numbers and give less weight to other factors. ... Certainly it has an impact
on racial diversity because of all the well-known information about how Blacks
tend to do not as well on standardized tests and that [effect] is not good."
Michael Sauder & Wendy Nelson Espeland, The Discipline of Rankings: Tight Coupling
and Organizational Change, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 63, 73 (2009) (quoting an unidentified law
school dean).
104. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 601.
105. Id. (quoting study respondent).
106. Id. at 605.
107. Id. (quoting study respondent).
108. Id. at 601; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 95, app. at 34 (noting that lower
average LSAT scores and UGPAs may have negatively impacted law school enrollment of
African Americans and Hispanics and reporting that "according to representatives from
LSAC, the ABA, some law schools, and one minority student group, schools are reluctant
to admit applicants with lower LSAT scores because the median LSAT score is a key
factor in the U.S. News and World Report rankings").
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To be sure, the U.S. News rankings are not the sole impediment
to diversity in higher education nor the sole reason for the prevailing
emphasis on test scores.' 9 There are other factors that lead
admissions staffs to depend more on standardized test profiles in
sorting students in the admissions process. For example, the relative
scarcity of high test scores compared with high grade point averages
and the fact that "some numbers are easier to raise than others" will
encourage admissions staffs to rely more on standardized test
scores."o And others have argued that efforts by accreditation bodies
to promote standardization and uniformity in schools have
contributed to the emphasis on standardized tests in admissions."'
That said, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that rankings
pressure schools to emphasize standardized test scores, thereby
creating a significant and not easily surmountablel 2 obstacle to
meaningful diversity in higher education.
109. While the U.S. News rankings may have increased reliance on standardized test
scores, they cannot be said to have caused schools to require standardized tests for
admission in the first place. Colleges began requiring standardized tests long before the
advent of the U.S. News rankings. Caroline M. Hoxby, The Changing Selectivity of
American Colleges, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 103 (2009) (noting the dramatic increase in the
number of colleges requiring the SAT or ACT from 1955 to 1965 and in periods
thereafter). That said, the U.S. News rankings remain a significant factor in increasing and
entrenching reliance on standardized test scores. See SACKS, supra note 77, at 13-15
(describing reasons why standardized testing remains entrenched, highlighting the role of
U.S. News rankings as a marker of prestige).
110. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 598.
111. Rachel F. Moran, Of Rankings and Regulation: Are the U.S. News and World
Report Rankings Really a Subversive Force in Legal Education?, 81 IND. L.J. 383, 397-98
(2006) (highlighting the role of the ABA accreditation standards). But cf GAO REPORT,
supra note 95, app. at 31 (noting that most law school officials did not cite ABA
accreditation standards as having an impact on minority access to law schools but
acknowledging that some officials from some law schools, especially less selective schools
risking de-accreditation, believed that accreditation standards impacted minority access).
112. Of course, schools do attempt to game the U.S. News rankings in an effort to
reconcile their institutional goals (including diversity) with preserving or raising their
rankings. See, e.g., Bastedo & Bowman, supra note 70, at 6 (summarizing ways in which
universities manipulate data provided to U.S. News); William D. Henderson & Andrew P.
Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S.
News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L.J. 163, 180-81, 191, 201-02 (2006) (discussing gaming);
Sauder & Espeland, supra note 103, at 76-77 (summarizing law school gaming strategies
and how U.S. News responded to them). For example, law schools can theoretically
maximize the median LSAT score by admitting the top half of the class with high test
scores while still emphasizing diversity or other characteristics for students scoring below
the median. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 606; see also Moran, supra note 111, at
389. But many schools do not take full advantage of this tactic, and, even if they did,
developing and executing gaming strategies generates economic costs. Moreover, there is
no assurance that any particular gaming tactic will be available for long, as U.S. News has
been known to revise its algorithm from time to time to foreclose gaming. For example,
schools have "steer[ed] students with lower test scores into their part-time programs" in
2011] THE DIVERSITY DOUBLE STANDARD 971
So far, I have demonstrated the following chain:
underrepresented minorities have lower median/average test scores;
diversity policies that increase the number of such minorities in the
student body decrease the median/average test scores of the entire
student body; test scores disproportionately swing U.S. News
rankings, which are the de facto measure of university prestige. Now,
I summon the evidence to show that with this loss of prestige comes
loss of revenues from the two main sources: tuition and donations.
As for tuition, economic analysis of admissions and pricing data
provided by thirty private colleges and universities over an eleven
year period shows that a fall in an institution's U.S. News ranking not
only impacts the school's "admit" and "yield" rates113 but also leads to
a reduction in the amount of tuition charged, as adjusted to discount
for the amount of grant or financial aid awarded (referred to as
"grant-aid-adjusted tuition").1 14 In other words, a "less favorable
ranking prompts institutions to provide more generous grant aid" to
attract students."' Accordingly, "higher-ranked institutions do not
have to offer deep discounts to attract matriculants."116
an effort to maintain diversity while not threatening their rankings. Espeland & Sauder,
supra note 67, at 602. This tactic appeared to work (for a while) because U.S News
rankings had "only considered the LSAT scores and UGPAs of full-time first year
students in its calculations of selectivity." Id. However, in 2009, U.S. News changed its
methodology to include part-time students. See id. at 602-03. For a discussion of revisions
to U.S. News' algorithm, see Sauder & Espeland, supra note 103, at 77 (summarizing U.S.
News' successful measures to foreclose particular gaming strategies).
113. Monks & Ehrenberg, supra note 72, at 45-47 (finding that a movement from a
more favorable to a less favorable rank of five places, for example, is associated with a
"statistically significant increase in the institution's admit rate of almost 2 percentage
points" and a decrease in its yield rate of almost one percentage point). An institution
whose rank falls "must admit a greater percentage of its shrinking applicant pool in order
to fill its incoming class" and may expect a decrease in the number of students
matriculating. Id. at 46. The "admit" rate is the number of admitted students as a
percentage of the total number of applicants. Id. at 45. The "yield" rate is the number of
matriculants as a percentage of the total number of admitted students. Id.
114. Id. at 48 (finding that a movement from a more favorable to a less favorable rank
of ten positions, for example, "leads to a reduction in grant-aid-adjusted tuition of
approximately 4 percent"). Please note that the rankings terminology used in the Monks
and Ehrenberg study may be confusing in that the authors refer to a "less favorable"
movement in rank as an "increase in rank." Id. at 47. For example, the authors would
describe a move from the number five position to a number ten position as an "increase in
rank," even though such a movement obviously reflects a drop in the institution's prestige
standing. See id.
115. Id. at 48. Monks and Ehrenberg believe that schools are reluctant to reduce their
gross tuition levels directly because the listed amounts act, in part, as "a signal of academic
quality," and an institution "does not want to reveal its declining [market] position." Id.
116. Id. at 49. For a more detailed account of the Monks-Ehrenberg study, see
generally James Monks & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, The Impact of U.S. News & World
Report College Rankings on Admissions Outcomes and Pricing Policies at Selective Private
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As for donations, the evidence is more anecdotal; however, it
points in the same direction. Rankings matter not only to students but
also to "alumni, trustees, and the politicians who set the budgets of
public colleges.""'7  Various commentators have suggested that
decreased rankings means decreased donations."' As one dean
described the reaction of alumni and trustees on his/her school's
change in rankings:
"The law school faculties and the smart administrators all say,
'This [the rankings] is a bunch of hooey, we don't care about
this,' until they drop and the board of trustees says, 'Hey,
you're dropping; why should we give you more money?' And
the board of visitors from the law school say, 'Man, your
school's really going to pot and you haven't changed a thing....
Big changes need to be made here.' And your monetary
support-the alumni-say, 'Well, I'm not sure I want to support
a school that's going in the wrong direction.' And your money
starts to dry up, and you go 'We have got to have the money;
Institutions (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research and Cornell Higher Educ. Research Inst.,
Working Paper No. 7227, 1999). In addition, econometric data confirms that higher-
credentialed students seek enrollment at higher status schools which can, and do, make
higher educational expenditures and charge higher tuition rates. Geiger, supra note 62, at
87-89; Caroline M. Hoxby, How the Changing Market Structure of U.S. Higher Education
Explains College Tuition 39 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6323,
1997) (arguing that the higher education market induces selective institutions "to supply a
more expensive education to students of higher ability who receive higher 'wages'
[subsidies] for their inputs and pay a higher price [tuition] for their education"). Although
the higher education market incentivizes schools to increase educational spending,
because higher prices might discourage some high-credentialed students, institutions also
give "direct subsidies to price-sensitive students in the form of need-based financial aid,
and increasingly merit-based aid," as well as increasing "spending more rapidly than
prices" (in the form of tuition). Geiger, supra note 62, at 88; see also Bastedo & Bowman,
supra note 70, at 17 (finding statistical support for the hypothesis that "[clollege rankings
also significantly affect out-of-state tuition and fees").
117. Guinier, supra note 75, at 145; see also Bastedo & Bowman, supra note 70, at 19
(finding statistical support for the hypothesis that "college rankings have an effect on
research and development funding from government and industry").
118. See, e.g., Bastedo & Bowman, supra note 70, at 17 (finding, based on quantitative
analysis, that "rankings affect the proportion of alumni who donate to their university, but
this effect is not apparent for the total amount of alumni donations"); McDonough et al.,
supra note 64, at 533 ("[N]egative rankings propel colleges to engage in damage control
with alumni and major donors and positive rankings become prominent features in
admissions and alumni communication materials."); Sauder & Espeland, supra note 66, at
213 (noting that many administrators believe that rankings influence "employers'
decisions about whom to hire, and the decisions of alumni about how much to give to their
alma maters").
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we can't afford to lose funding or else it will spiral downhill and
we will be a worse law school.' "119
In conclusion, the bottom line is that promoting non-token
diversity decreases university revenues collected through tuition and
donations. To be clear, my personal view is that this is a deeply
unfortunate fact that argues strongly against an overreliance on the
U.S. News rankings. But my normative views cannot change the
economic reality that there is a financial cost to pursuing meaningful
educational diversity, given our current state of affairs. Unless U.S.
News dramatically changes its formula to incorporate racial diversity
into its overall rankings, which it has so far declined to do,120 or the
119. Sauder & Lancaster, supra note 68, at 130 (quoting an unidentified dean).
Quantitative research on student profiles reveals that students place great weight on
rankings due, in part, to their belief that rankings affect the ability of graduates to land
good jobs and gain admission to good graduate schools. Of course, today's students are
tomorrow's alumni. See McDonough et al., supra note 64, at 523 (noting that, among
students who find rankings very important, they are "influenced by a college's reputation
for its alumni to get into top graduate schools" and "are twice as likely to give weight to a
college's reputation for graduates to land good jobs compared to students who find them
to be not important").
120. Since 2001, U.S. News has "publish[ed] a 'diversity index' that ranks schools based
on measures of the proportion of minority students." Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at
593. However, the "diversity index is not factored into the overall rankings"-it is
"presented separately." Id.; see also Best Colleges 2011, Racial Diversity: National
Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/
best-colleges/national-campus-ethnic-diversity (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter U.S.
News Diversity Index].
Professor Coleman disputes my claim that "there is plenty of evidence to suggest
that meaningful affirmative action programs that admit more than token numbers of
underrepresented minorities (including Latinos, African Americans, and American
Indians) generate more economic costs than economic benefits to universities." See supra
notes 59-61 and accompanying text. To dispute my claim, Professor Coleman cites to the
U.S. News Diversity Index to "find evidence for the opposite conclusion, or at least for the
proposition that diversity and high ranking appear to be compatible goals." Coleman,
supra note 20, at 1011. But Professor Coleman offers no plausible evidence to back his
claim that there is no trade-off between cultivating meaningful diversity and
maintaining/enhancing one's prestige standing, as expressed by U.S. News, which is the
only proposition that would be the opposite of my claim. Moreover, he offers no
counterevidence to refute any of the evidence that I have marshaled. Basically, all that
Professor Coleman does to attack my claim is to provide a statistic. He points out that
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (Newark), whose ranking is 143/253 in its
category, has the highest U.S. News diversity score (0.74) of all universities in the nation.
Id. (citing U.S. News Diversity Index, supra). From this datum, he boldly concludes that "it
does not obviously appear that more diversity has a negative impact on a school's
ranking." Id. This is not self-evident; worse, it is a non sequitur. After all, the ability to
locate a school that has both a "decent" overall U.S. News rank (143/253) and a high
diversity score (0.74) says nothing about the overall relationship between diversity and
U.S. News rank. One wonders if Professor Coleman also thinks that there can be no
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public (including students seeking admission) renounces the U.S.
News as the marker of institutional prestige, meaningful affirmative
action programs (to the extent that they exist)121 will continue to
decrease university revenues.
2. Increased Administrative Expenses
I now switch to the other side of the ledger. Effective
administration of affirmative action programs takes up significant
financial resources.
correlation between blood cholesterol levels and heart disease, since there are certainly
individuals with high cholesterol levels who don't actually have heart disease.
Moreover, Professor Coleman overlooks the critical fact that the U.S. News
Diversity Index employs a different definition of diversity than that employed in my
Article or, for that matter, employed by the University of Michigan's (and most
universities') affirmative action programs. The U.S. News Diversity Index emphasizes the
"overall mix of groups" and fails to distinguish between underrepresented and well-
represented minorities (e.g., certain Asian American groups who are typically regarded as
well represented minorities under most affirmative action programs). See U.S. News
Diversity Index, supra (noting their use of the following categories in their calculations:
"American Indians and Native Alaskans, Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders, African
Americans who are non-Hispanic, whites who are non-Hispanic, and Hispanics"). As a
result, no statistic in the U.S. News Diversity Index can be used to refute my claim, which
incorporates a different definition of diversity than the U.S. News' Diversity Index. The
fact that U.S. News' definition of diversity significantly differs from mine is made clear in
U.S. News' treatment of historically black universities. As noted by sociologists Wendy
Espeland and Michael Sauder, the U.S. News Diversity Index "punish[es] the historically
black law schools that enroll large proportions of African Americans, even though these
schools create much-needed diversity at the organizational level and contribute
significantly to the diversity [of] the profession." Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 605;
see also Methodology: Campus Ethnic Diversity, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/best-colleges/2010/08/17/methodology-campus-
ethnic-diversity-2011.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (acknowledging that "historically
black colleges score very low on this measure since they are made up of predominately
one ethnic group."). By contrast, I would rate the historically black schools as very diverse.
121. Fortunately, some colleges and universities have at least staked an official
commitment to creating a diverse student body and do employ variables other than test
scores to determine admission. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE
OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 23-26 (2000) (summarizing the aims of university
admissions policies and noting that "[ujnderstanding the aims of the institution in choosing
its students helps us see why admissions officers in virtually all selective colleges and
professional schools look well beyond grades and test scores"); JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE
MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 172 (2002) ("By the mid-1970s ... university elites
clearly were committed to reaching out to minority groups, and with zeal and creativity
developed reasons why it was a good idea."); STEVENS, supra note 72, at 143 (noting that
admissions officers' ethical convictions have helped "to sustain rigorous minority
recruitment efforts at the nation's most elite schools"); id. at 169-73 (noting that
"fv]irtually every selective college and university in the country has an official
commitment to racial diversity" but citing obstacles to minority recruitment).
THE DIVERSITY DOUBLE STANDARD
Search costs. Administrators must expend time to consider race
or ethnicity as a factor in the admissions process, and that additional
time does not come free. Moreover, these costs have substantially
increased as a result of the Gratz and Grutter decisions. Grutter
clarified that postsecondary schools may only consider race or
ethnicity as a "soft variable"'22 in admissions decisions and required a
"highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file" 123
against all other applicants to withstand a constitutional challenge.124
Of course, the type of individual review that would pass constitutional
muster is "highly problematic for large universities as their applicant
pool can be as high as 500% of that of smaller schools."1 25 Thus, some
large universities wishing to ensure a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students have had no choice but to
augment their admissions staffs.126  For example, Ohio State
University spent an additional $250,000 on the admissions process
during the year following Gratz and Grutter and hired thirty-five
additional application readers.127 And the University of Michigan's
undergraduate admissions office hired additional application
counselors and readers, at a cost of $1.8 million, to move to a system
of holistic review of application files.128
Sometimes the search costs go beyond application processing.
Some colleges and universities have developed special "service
programs" designed to scout for promising underrepresented
minority high school students and facilitate their preparation and
transition to college.129 These programs generate nontrivial search
costs.3 0
122. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003) (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 337.
124. Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Cost of Good Intentions: Why the Supreme Court's
Decision Upholding Affirmative Action Admission Programs Is Detrimental to the Cause,
27 PACE L. REV. 15, 15-16, 45 (2006).
125. Id. at 16.
126. Id.
127. Greg Winter, After Ruling, 3 Universities Maintain Diversity in Admissions, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2004, at A22.
128. Id.; see also Justin Pope, UMass Spends Money and Time to Keep Affirmative
Action Effort, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 20, 2004 (noting that the University of
Massachusetts "hired retired faculty and recent graduates to read applications" and that
UMass, Michigan, and Ohio State spent more funds on recruiting students as a result of
the Supreme Court decisions); Greg Winter, U. of Michigan Alters Policy on Using Race in
Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at All (estimating an increase of $1.5 million to
$2 million for the University of Michigan's admissions process).
129. STEVENS, supra note 72, at 167-69 (describing these programs).
130. Id. (describing the nature of the programming and some of the extensive
recruitment efforts).
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Yield costs. Merely offering admission to minority students will
not necessarily yield a critical mass of matriculants, because minority
students may have a disproportionate need for financial aid since
underrepresented minorities "are more likely to come from low-
income families" and "are also likely to be more price-sensitive to
tuition than white and middle- or upper-income students."' 3'
Moreover, the rankings have intensified the intercollegiate
competition for underrepresented minority students with high test
scores.132 Indeed, those students may be offered "generous financial
aid packages, expenses-paid recruitment visits," and other benefits
from selective schools jockeying to improve their minority numbers
while seeking to maintain their prestige standing."33
Borrowing costs. Another reason why meaningful affirmative
action programs may generate more economic costs than economic
benefits to universities is that affirmative action programs may
negatively impact the university's bond ratings. Average SAT scores
not only affect the U.S. News rankings but are also relied upon by
bond-rating agencies to evaluate a university's financial viability.'34
As noted by Kimberly West-Faulcon:
The three major financial rating agencies-Moody's Investors
Service, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch Ratings-consider
average SAT scores as part of their credit analyses. Because it
has become increasingly common for colleges and universities
to issue bonds to raise money for major expansion projects,
many institutions have a very direct financial incentive to try to
increase their overall average SAT score. The fact that average
SAT score is used to gauge institutional financial health as well
as prestige encourages admissions officials to place even greater
weight on SAT scores as an admissions criterion.'
All of the above is to say that affirmative action programs are
simply not free; in the aggregate, they decrease revenues and increase
131. Osamudia R. James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing Viability of Minority-
Targeted Aid in Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851, 872 (2010).
132. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 67, at 601; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 95,
app. at 33 ("Some law school officials said that schools compete for minority applicants
with above-average LSAT scores."); STEVENS, supra note 72, at 166 ("Literally every
selective college in the country is after the same small number of minority kids each
year."); id. at 169-70 ("Virtually every selective college and university in the country has
an official commitment to racial diversity, yet at the top of the college selection pyramid
there are very few black and Latino students to go around.").
133. STEVENS, supra note 72, at 169.
134. West-Faulcon, supra note 66, at 1108.
135. Id.
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costs for universities without any guarantee of a reciprocal economic
benefit. My personal belief is that those economic costs should
nonetheless be borne by universities as their concrete contribution to
racial justice in our society.136 I make this clarification to provide
comfort to readers who might not be able to hear my substantive
argument otherwise. Again, the argument is that corporations are
advocating a double standard. On the one hand, corporations call for
diversity in the workplace if and only if it serves their economic self-
interest. On the other hand, corporations call for diversity at
universities-in well-publicized legal interventions-even if it cuts
against universities' economic self-interest.
II. IS THE DOUBLE STANDARD JUSTIFIED?
One might argue that corporations are simply taking a different
standard, not a double standard, regarding corporate diversity versus
educational diversity. After all, different standards can be justified to
the extent that corporations and universities are differently situated,
e.g., subject to different sets of rules that impinge on their abilities to
promote diversity. One obvious way that corporations and
universities are differently situated is their for-profit/nonprofit legal
status. Business corporations are by definition for-profit corporations
while most (but not all) universities are organized as nonprofit
corporations.13 7 Accordingly, one might think that for-profit
corporations must only do what is in their economic self-interest (i.e.,
maximize profits) and that nonprofit corporations must ignore their
economic self-interest (i.e., ignore profits), thus justifying the double
standard. But an examination of nonprofit and for-profit corporation
laws suggests that this is not the case.
First, state corporation codes generally do not proscribe for-
profit corporations from engaging in non-profit-generating
activities.' 8 This is so in spite of the common view, as best
exemplified by Milton Friedman, that the "one and only one social
136. By "racial justice," I refer to the substantive policy goal of reducing racial group
inequalities in wealth and power. See Glenn C. Loury, Foreword to BOWEN & BOK, supra
note 121, at xxi, xxii-xxiii; see also infra note 266 and accompanying text.
137. In 2006, only 450 out of 2,611, or 17.23%, four-year universities were organized as
for-profit corporations. Accordingly, the vast majority of four-year universities were
organized as nonprofit corporations. Career/Technical Education (CTE) Statistics, NAT'L
CrR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ctes/tables/P71.asp (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011).
138. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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responsibility of business . . . [is] to increase its profits." 9 Indeed,
state corporation statutes generally permit for-profits to be organized
to carry out "any lawful business or purposes,"" and the vast
majority of corporate charters contain precisely this nonrestrictive
mandate.14'
Second, state corporation codes expressly grant directors the
legal discretion to undertake certain reasonable profit-sacrificing
activities. For example, every state has enacted a corporate statute
providing managers the formal authority to make corporate
charitable contributions out of corporate funds.142 Further, most state
codes contain "other-constituency provisions," which expressly
authorize boards to consider the interests of nonshareholder
constituents (i.e., employees, customers, creditors, and the
139. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is
to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32, 124. This duty to
maximize shareholder profits has been preached in American business schools and
embraced by many corporate managers. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory
Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 717 (1996); Jill E. Fisch,
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L.
637, 654-55 (2006) (noting a study finding "that the norm of shareholder wealth
maximization was implicit in most business school courses"); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A
Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1288 (1992) ("Directors
seem to believe that their legal duty is to the stockholders."). But see infra note 164 (citing
source that indicates that managerial adoption of the shareholder wealth maximization
norm is vastly overstated).
140. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2008); see also JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET
AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 171 (6th ed. 2007)
(discussing typical corporate charters).
141. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Microsoft
Corporation art. III (Nov. 24, 2009), available at http://www.microsoft.com/investor/
corporategovernance/policiesandguidelines/articlesincorp.aspx#a_3 ("The Corporation is
organized for the purposes of transacting any and all lawful business for which a
corporation may be incorporated under the Washington Business Corporation Act, Title
23B of the Revised Code of Washington, now or hereafter in force (the 'Act')."); Charter
of Lockheed Martin Corporation art. III (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://www.lockheed
martin.com/investor/corporate-govemance/corporatecharter.html ("The purpose for
which the Corporation is formed is to engage in any lawful act, activity or business for
which corporations may now or hereafter be organized under the Maryland General
Corporation Law.. .. ").
142. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 763 (2005). For example, REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.02(13) (2004),
authorizes corporations to make donations for the public welfare, and DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 122(9) (2008) grants corporations the power to make donations for the public
welfare or for charitable purposes. Although these statutes do not limit the amount of
permissible gifts, courts have implied a reasonableness limitation on the size of the
charitable donations. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404
(Del. Ch. 1969) (noting that "a corporate charitable or educational gift to be valid must
merely be within reasonable limits both as to amount and purpose").
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community) in making business decisions.14 3 Although these
constituency provisions were originally crafted during the 1980s to
fend off hostile takeovers, most are not confined to takeovers and
apply to any managerial decision.1"
Third, corporate case law also suggests that for-profit
corporations can undertake reasonable profit-sacrificing activities'45
in the interests of other constituencies. Even Dodge v. Ford,146 the
1919 Michigan Supreme Court opinion known for the proposition
that the corporate purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth,147
failed to eliminate the discretion of directors to advance other
important social values. At most, Dodge v. Ford imposed a vague
limitation requiring other-regarding motives to be incidental to the
primary purpose of profiting shareholders.148 In practice, that
limitation has been a "toothless," largely unenforceable one.149 As
many scholars have pointed out, courts have routinely upheld
directors' discretion to benefit nonshareholder constituents at the
expense of shareholders, often in cases reaffirming the business
judgment rule, which insulates corporate decisions (including those
that allegedly do not maximize shareholder value) from judicial
143. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus.
REV. 163, 169 (2008); see also Elhauge, supra note 142, at 766-67. To be sure, Delaware
does not have a corporate constituency statute. But Delaware does authorize (through its
case law) managers to reject takeover bids due to considerations relating to
nonshareholder constituencies. See Elhauge, supra note 142, at 848-49.
144. Elhauge, supra note 142, at 763; see also Fairfax, supra note 61, at 686 (noting that
"[a]t least two thirds of the constituency statutes extend beyond takeovers, allowing
directors to consider the concerns of non-shareholders when making ordinary business
decisions").
145. See Stout, supra note 143, at 169-72 (arguing that corporate case law does not
require companies to maximize shareholder wealth).
146. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
147. See id. at 684.
148. Id.; see also Elhauge, supra note 142, at 772-73; M. Todd Henderson & Anup
Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571,
572 n.3 (2009) (noting that Dodge v. Ford did "not create a substantive standard that is
enforceable in court, but rather an aspirational goal for corporate directors"); Stout, supra
note 143, at 166 ("Dodge v. Ford is indeed bad law, at least when cited for the proposition
that the corporate purpose is, or should be, maximizing shareholder wealth.").
149. As Thomas Joo has argued:
As applied, directors' supposed duty to "maximize" shareholder wealth is a
toothless one. No courts actually require management to maximize shareholder
wealth-that is, to show that they have chosen the one use of corporate resources
that will generate more net wealth than any other. Indeed, such a showing would
be all but impossible.
Joo, supra note 36, at 361.
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review."so As the Dodge court expressly noted, directors retain
"implied powers to carry on with humanitarian motives such
charitable works as are incidental to the main business of the
corporation."s' In sum, no corporate law norm stands in the way of
directors undertaking reasonable profit-sacrificing activities to benefit
nonshareholder constituents or to further important social values.
Accordingly, no corporate law norm prohibits a company from
adopting a reasonable affirmative action plan in pursuit of diversity.
And not only are business corporations permitted to undertake
profit-sacrificing activities, they have increasingly done so in recent
years. For example, Patagonia, an outdoor gear and clothing
company, has pledged about one percent of sales to environmental
causes.'52 Google Inc. has made a similar pledge'5 3 and, more
aggressively, launched a division, Google.org, dedicated to "pursuing
the company's philanthropic goals ... to address 'climate change,
poverty and emerging disease.' "154 Google.org has already spent over
$100 million in grants and investments."'s Similarly, in an effort to
provide income support to farmers in the developing world, Starbucks
pays fair trade prices (which can be twice as high as competitive
prices) to its coffee suppliers.'5 6 Cinergy has publicly committed to
voluntarily reducing carbon emissions. 15 7 AstraZeneca has provided
150. Elhauge, supra note 142, at 775; Fisch, supra note 139, at 651 ("[N]o modern court
has struck down an operational decision on the ground that it favors stakeholder interests
over shareholder interests."); William H. Simon, What Difference Does It Make Whether
Corporate Managers Have Public Responsibilities?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1697, 1698
(1993) ("I am unaware of a single modern case in which a managerial decision has been
held wrongful because it put public interests above shareholder ones."); Stout, supra note
143, at 170.
151. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684; Stout, supra note 143, at 168.
152. Henderson & Malani, supra note 148, at 575. In 1985 Patagonia launched a
campaign called "1% for the Planet," in which it pledges one percent of sales for the
"preservation and restoration of the environment." See 1% for the Planet, PATAGONIA,
http://www.patagonia.com/euro/en- GBGB-/patagonia.go?assetid=1960 (last visited Feb.
22, 2011).
153. Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437,
2439-40 (2009).
154. Id. at 2440 (quoting Searching for Solutions, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google
.org/index.html).
155. Id. at 2443.
156. Henderson & Malani, supra note 148, at 591; see also STARBUCKS COFFEE,
LIVING OUR VALUES: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, FISCAL 2003 ANNUAL
REPORT 33 (2004), available at http://assets.starbucks.com/assets/csr-fy03-ar.pdf (noting
that Starbucks paid a premium between 59% and 200% above prevailing market prices for
coffee in 2003).
157. Henderson & Malani, supra note 148, at 574 n.16 (citing Mike Boyer, Cinergy to
Reduce Airborne Emissions, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 10, 2003, at lA).
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free medicine to uninsured people.' Ben & Jerry's Homemade Ice
Cream, Inc. sources its milk and cream from a local cooperative
dedicated to environmental sustainability, brownies from another
social enterprise (a bakery providing job-training), and much of its ice
cream flavors from cooperatives of poor farmers (at fair trade
prices).5 9 Corporations have collectively contributed over $10 billion
to charity in a single year "even though such giving has only the most
tenuous connection to shareholder interests.""so
To be sure, these ostensibly philanthropic activities may have
been undertaken not for public-regarding reasons but, rather, for
longer-term profit-enhancing reasons or because of managerial graft.
After all, doing good for others can be a strategic public relations
ploy, designed to improve consumer perception of the firm's brand
and increase future revenues.'61 For example, Philip Morris's $250
million ad campaign publicizing its philanthropic activities was widely
dismissed as a "smoke screen to divert attention from its cigarette
business. "162 But empirical research on corporate philanthropy,
though not conclusive, suggests that corporate executives have mixed
motives, including altruistic ones, when making corporate
donations.'63 And other empirical research suggests that corporate
158. Id. (citing Press Release, AstraZeneca, AstraZeneca to Provide Free Medicines to
Facilities that Serve the Uninsured in West Virginia (Jan. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.astrazeneca-us.com/about-astrazenecaus/newsroom/corporate/2041753?itemld
=2041753).
159. Reiser, supra note 153, at 2450 n.79 (citing Activism: Inside the Pint, BEN &
JERRY'S, http:// www.benjerry.com/activismlinside-the-pint/).
160. Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 116-17
(2004); see also William 0. Brown, Jr. et al., Corporate Philanthropic Practices, 12 J. CORP.
FIN. 855, 876 (2006) (citing statistic that U.S. corporations gave approximately $12.2
billion in 2002). Despite the absence of a strong nexus to profit-making, courts have
regularly upheld such charitable endeavours over the objections of complaining
shareholders. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398,405 (Del. Ch.
1969); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953).
161. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 9.6, at
437 (2002) (suggesting that "charitable giving is simply another form of advertising").
162. Ronald Alsop, Perils of Corporate Philanthropy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at B1.
163. Brown et al., supra note 160, at 856, 875-76 (concluding that evidence supports
both agency cost and profit-maximization explanations (which are not mutually exclusive)
for charitable giving and that "agency cost theory also contemplates that managers and
directors may authorize gifts out of an altruistic belief that firms have a social
responsibility to contribute to worthy causes"); Henderson & Malani, supra note 148, at
580-81; Peter Navarro, Why Do Corporations Give to Charity, 61 J. BuS. 65, 67, 89-90
(1988) (adopting a model of corporate charity that "treats the paradigms of profit
maximization and managerial discretion as complementary rather than competing" and
finding a correlation between charitable contributions and advertising expenditures); Bill
Shaw & Frederick R. Post, A Moral Basis for Corporate Philanthropy, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS
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executives have not embraced the shareholder wealth maximization
norm as widely as previously thought."
Given obvious epistemological limitations in ascertaining the
true motives of corporate executives, suffice it to say that other-
regarding motives do seem to affect executives, and some executives
at least profess a willingness to sacrifice profit to further certain social
values. To take a vivid example, not only do Google's leaders openly
"aspire to make Google an institution that makes the world a better
place,"l65 but they have also proclaimed with respect to Google.org:
" 'We're not doing it for the profit. And if we didn't get our capital
back, so what? The emphasis is on social returns, not economic
returns.' "166 Consider also John Mackey, founder and CEO of Whole
Foods, who has criticized Milton Friedman for "undersell[ing] the
humanitarian dimension of capitalism: 'Whole Foods' business model
could represent a new form of capitalism, one that more consciously
works for the common good instead of depending solely on the
'invisible hand' to generate positive results for society.' "167
While for-profits are not proscribed from engaging in non-profit-
generating or even profit-sacrificing activities, the converse is true for
nonprofits: they are not proscribed from seeking profits. Although a
few states once restricted the permissible purposes of nonprofits,' 68
many (perhaps most) nonprofits today may be incorporated to carry
745, 747-48 (1993) (reporting that the "overwhelmingly dominant" explanation for why
executives engage in corporate philanthropy was "corporate citizenship").
164. Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm
for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REv. 987, 1011-12 (2009) (citing studies).
165. Reiser, supra note 153, at 2439 (quoting Google Inc., Letter from the Founders:
"An Owner's Manual" for Google's Shareholders, in Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1
Registration Statement Under the Security Act of 1933 (Form S-I), at 27, 32 (Aug. 18,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504142742
/dsla.htm).
166. Reiser, supra note 153, at 2452 (citing Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google's Way:
Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at Al (quoting then-Google.org executive
director Dr. Larry Brilliant)).
167. Brown et al., supra note 160, at 856 n.2 (quoting Reason Found., Rethinking the
Social Responsibility of Business: A Reason Debate Featuring Milton Friedman, Whole
Foods' John Mackey, and Cypress Semiconductor's T.J. Rogers, REASON, Oct. 2005, at 31,
31); see also John Mackey, Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business, WHOLE
FOODS MARKET: THE CEO'S BLOG (Sept. 28, 2005), http://www2.wholefoods
market.com/blogs/jmackey/2005/09/28/rethinking-the-social-responsibility-of-business/
(reproducing the debate found in a Reason Foundation article with commentary).
168. See, e.g., Illinois General Not for Profit Corporation Act, § 4, 1943 Ill. Laws 481,
483 (current version at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/103.05 (2010)). Indeed, in the 1950s, the
restrictive form of statute was the most common. See Note, Permissible Purposes of
Nonprofit Corporations, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 889, 890 (1951).
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on "any lawful purpose." 16 9 Indeed, some nonprofit corporation
statutes expressly permit profit-seeking activity.17 0 More to the point,
nonprofit universities can and do earn huge profits.
As a mounting body of scholarship recognizes,17 1 universities
have increasingly become commercialized 72 and profit-oriented in
their never-ending quest to acquire greater financial resources.173 Key
legislative developments, such as the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,174
together with the rise of certain industries such as biogenetics,
triggered a surge of corporate funding for university research, which
expanded opportunities for universities to realize commercial gain."'
Universities actively pursued patents for their technologies, cultivated
business incubation programs, and formed venture capital funds to
invest in companies founded by faculty.'76 By 1990, "two hundred
universities had established offices to seek out commercially
promising discoveries and patent them for licensing to companies."1 77
By 2000, "universities had increased the volume of their patenting
169. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
497, 510 (1981); see also REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 3.01(a), 3.02(16)
(1987) (stating that nonprofits incorporated under its auspices "ha[ve] the purpose of
engaging in any lawful activity" and empowering nonprofits "to carry on a business").
170. See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, at viii-ix (1964); JAMES J. FISHMAN &
STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 81 (2006) ("Nonprofit organizations
may conduct activities for pecuniary gain so long as the profit is used for the organization's
exempt purpose and there is no distribution of profits to members or exploitation of the
organization for direct monetary gain."); Hansmann, supra note 169, at 512.
171. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 63, at 2; JAMES S. FAIRWEATHER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP
AND HIGHER EDUCATION: LESSONS FOR COLLEGES, UNIVERSITIES, AND INDUSTRIES
passim (1988); ROGER GEIGER, KNOWLEDGE AND MONEY: RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES
AND THE PARADOX OF THE MARKETPLACE passim (2004); SHEILA SLAUGHTER &
LARRY LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY passim (1997); David J. Collis, New Business Models
for Higher Education, in THE FUTURE OF THE CITY OF INTELLECT: THE CHANGING
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, supra note 62, at 181, 181; Walter Powell & Jason Owen-Smith,
Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253, 256-58 (1998); James Engell & Anthony Dangerfield, The
Market Model University: Humanities in the Age of Money, HARV. MAG., May-June 1998,
at 48, 53-55.
172. For purposes of this Article, in the university context, "commercialization" is
defined as "efforts to sell the work of universities for a profit." BOK, supra note 63, at 3.
173. See id. at 9-10.
174. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3018-29 (1980) (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). The Bayh-Dole Act
facilitated universities' owning and licensing patents on discoveries made through publicly
funded research. See id.
175. BOK, supra note 63, at 58.
176. Id. at 12; Geiger, supra note 62, at 82.
177. BOK, supra note 63, at 12.
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more than ten-fold and were earning more than $1 billion per year in
royalties and license fees.",1 8
But nothing epitomizes the commercialization of universities
better than college athletics. Even as they slash budgets in other
academic areas, universities have long invested in intercollegiate
sports in search of profits."' As Derek Bok, former president of
Harvard University, observed:
As football and other intercollegiate sports tightened their grip
on American colleges, the quest for revenue grew more and
more determined. Universities built bigger stadia to attract
larger paying audiences. Gradually, students were moved
further and further away from the 50-yard line to make room
for "boosters" who contributed money to the athletic program.
Later, athletic departments added luxury boxes to lure
corporate sponsors and other wealthy patrons who could afford
to pay large sums for privileged accommodations complete with
food and bar service. Radio, and then television, brought
increasingly lucrative contracts for the benefit of colleges with
teams good enough to command a national audience.
Universities negotiated agreements with apparel manufacturers
Adidas, Nike, and Reebok to obtain free equipment and cash in
return for having their athletes wear the corporate insignia
during athletic contests. Bowl games multiplied, producing
additional television revenue: over $10 million for teams
fortunate enough to win an invitation to one of the premier
postseason contests. Meanwhile, the annual "March Madness"
basketball playoffs came to enjoy even greater success,
attracting such large audiences that the NCAA negotiated an
exclusive 11 year contract with CBS for the princely sum of $6
billion."'o
And commercialization hasn't been confined to sports or
research in the life sciences. Like good business corporations,
universities have capitalized on profit-generating opportunities with
respect to their basic operations. For example, California State
University at Fresno entered into an agreement with Pepsi-Cola and
178. Id.
179. Oksana Koltko, Comment, Chasing Profits-Disregarding Values: Legal Persona
of Elite Schools and Their Destructive Tax-Exempt Status, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1073,
1075-76 (2009).
180. BOK, supra note 63, at 37-38. Some schools take the commercialization to the
next level. For example, "Georgia Tech accept[ed] $5.5 million from McDonald's to place
the golden arches on the floor of its coliseum and on all tickets and game programs." Id. at
178.
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Save Mart whereby the school received $40 million in exchange for
the exclusive right to serve food and beverages on its campus.s" The
University of Minnesota (and nine other schools) entered into
agreements with TCF Bank, selling the right to attach debit and ATM
features to student identification cards.l"
Further, universities have long experimented with different ways
of generating a return on their core competence-teaching. Although
universities in the United States have traditionally been not-for-
profit, they have cultivated for-profit educational programs designed
to yield surpluses to subsidize other activities and defray operating
expenses.'83 In fact, as early as 1892, elite institutions had offered for-
profit correspondence schools for students having difficulty accessing
the campus." These correspondence schools eventually gave way to
campus-based extension programs targeted at students working full-
time.18' Business schools established lucrative executive programs for
corporate officials and offered courses specially tailored to the
distinct needs of particular corporations.186 For example, Harvard
Business School has generated over $100 million in annual revenue
from executive education programs catering to business
corporations.'8  Medical schools also generate profits from their
continuing education programs for practicing physicians.188 To keep
the costs of these programs down, they have relied on corporate
sponsorships by pharmaceutical and medical supply companies.'89
More recently, distance education via the Internet has opened up
new revenue possibilities. Although the market leader for distance
education has been the for-profit, vocationally oriented University of
Phoenix,0 nonprofit universities-such as Duke University,
University of Maryland, Stanford, and MIT-have followed suit and
181. Koltko, supra note 179, at 1081.
182. Id. at 1081-82.
183. BOK, supra note 63, at 81.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 82.
186. Id. at 84.
187. Annual Report 2009: Statement of Activity and Cash Flows, HARVARD BUS. SCH.,
http://www.hbs.edu/aboutlannualreport/2009/download2009/statements-2009.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2011).
188. BOK, supra note 63, at 85.
189. Id.
190. By 2001, the University of Phoenix had enrolled 110,000 students, most of whom
learn online. Id. at 91.
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cultivated distance learning programs. 91 In fact, as early as 2000,
online education was already a rapidly growing $2 billion business.19 2
Consistent with this process of commercialization, universities
have become managed more like business enterprises. Universities
seek administrators with financial backgrounds to ensure that capital
is sensibly invested. Presidents, deans, and administrators with
fundraising abilities are in demand. 93 Universities are hiring top fund
managers to oversee their large and lucrative endowments. 94 The
National Association of College and University Business Officers
released a study in 2008 revealing that 785 colleges and universities
amassed over $411 billion in endowment assets.195 During good
economic times, the average return on university endowments was
17.2%.196 The apparent profitability of nonprofit universities and
other tax-exempt institutions have made them attractive targets for
those clamoring for their taxation in hopes of reducing municipal
budget shortfalls. 9 7 In sum, nonprofits are not proscribed from
seeking profits, nor do they refrain from seeking profits.
In fact, one has to search long and hard to find any meaningful
legal distinction between for-profits and nonprofits.198 The sole
191. Id.
192. Id. at 87.
193. Koltko, supra note 179, at 1086.
194. See, e.g., Tom Petruno, El-Erian to Be Sole Chief of Pimco: The Star Investor Had
Returned in January from a Stint Managing Harvard's Endowment, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2008, at C4 (reporting El-Erian's appointment as CEO of bond fund giant Pimco).
195. Koltko, supra note 179, at 1087.
196. Id. This "translates into $70.7 billion in generated profits." Id.
197. See, e.g., Jesse Bogan, Nonprofits May Be Hit Up by City-Budget Deficit Leads to
Focus on Tax Exemptions, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 7, 2010, at Al; Thomas
Grillo, Pay Up, Nonprofits: City Wants $24M More Annually from Hospitals, Colleges,
BOS. HERALD, Apr. 6, 2010, at 20; Tracy Jan, More Cities Look to Universities to Share
Costs Amid Recession, Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 10, 2010, at Al; Karamagi Rujumba, County
Bill Seeks to Collect Fees from Nonprofits-Move Would Take Effect in Jan., Raise $13
Million Annually, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2009, at Al; Stephanie Strom,
Tax Exemptions of Charities Face New Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2008, at Al; Press
Release, Carnegie Mellon Univ., PCHE Institutions Share Deep Concerns over Services
Fee, Taxes on Future Land Purchases as Suggested in Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1175 and
House Bill 2191 (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.cmu.edu/news/archive/2010/January/
janl2_pchestatement.shtml; Rich Lord, Senate Committee Holds Hearing on Tax-Exempts,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10013/
1027733-53.stm; see also infra note 198 (regarding the tax-exempt status of nonprofit
universities).
198. The distinguishing feature is not that nonprofits are charitable and for-profits are
commercial. In fact, there are many commercial nonprofits engaged in the commercial sale
of products or services. For example, daycare centers, nursing homes, and hospitals are
commonly organized as commercial nonprofit corporations. A "commercial" organization
is one that "obtain[s] most of its income from prices charged for goods or services they
986 [Vol. 89
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(arguably) significant difference is that nonprofits are subject to the
"nondistribution constraint" and therefore may not distribute current
profits, or net earnings, to those with control over the corporation's
decisions, such as its directors, officers, or members.1 99 By contrast,
for-profit corporations may distribute excess cash flows to its
shareholders by paying dividends.2" But the nondistribution
constraint does not mean that nonprofits can or should ignore profits;
nor does its absence in the for-profit context mean that for-profit
corporations must engage only in profit-generating activities.
Moreover, it isn't entirely clear whether the nondistribution
constraint encumbers the activities of nonprofits in a way that
meaningfully distinguishes them from for-profits in the first place.201
produce." Hansmann, supra note 169, at 502. The distinguishing feature is not that
nonprofits are tax-exempt and for-profits are not. Although many nonprofits, including
universities, happen to be tax-exempt, nonprofits do not automatically qualify for state
and federal tax-exempt status but must apply for it and maintain it. "Just because an
organization is a non-profit does not mean that it qualifies for tax-exempt status at either
the federal or state level. Rather, the tax statutes generally exempt only a specified subset
of all non-profit organizations." Id. at 519. And, more recently, the tax-exempt status of
nonprofit universities has come under attack as cash-strapped local governments seek new
sources of revenue to close budget gaps. See, e.g., Moira Herbst, Princeton and Princeton
Face Off over Taxes, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., July 5-11, 2010, at 28, 28 (describing conflict
between the town of Princeton, New Jersey and Princeton University over taxes and
noting that "municipalities from Pittsburgh to Boston turn to local universities, whose land
holdings are mostly tax-exempt, to close budget gaps"); see also Koltko, supra note 179, at
1075, 1099 (proposing to uniformly tax universities). More importantly, the limitations
imposed by federal tax-exempt status neither encumber nor facilitate an organization's
ability to promote diversity and thus are not relevant to justifying the double standard.
199. Hansmann, supra note 169, at 501, 553 ("The prohibition on distributions of net
earnings to controlling individuals is the essential defining feature of a nonprofit
organization."); see also REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.40, 13.01 (1987)
(prohibiting payments from nonprofit corporations to their "members, directors, or
officers").
200. However, the mandate to declare dividends under state corporate law is quite
weak. Declaring dividends is generally within the discretion of the board of directors, as
limited by the corporation's financial and legal ability to pay. Only when the corporation
has no better use for the capital is there any risk of state courts compelling the declaration
of dividends. See, e.g., Schmitt v. Eagle Roller Mill Co., 272 N.W. 277, 282 (Minn. 1937);
Hofeller v. Gen. Candy Corp., 275 Ill. App. 89, 96 (1934). Indeed, only a minority of firms
pay dividends. For example, in 1999, only 20.8% of nonfinancial, nonutility listed firms
paid dividends. William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. L.J. 845, 851
(2005); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm
Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2001). Bratton also
notes that dividend yields shrank "from 5.4% in 1980 to 1.1% in 2000 for companies in the
S&P index." Bratton, supra, at 851 n.24 (citing H. Kent Baker et al., Revisiting the
Dividend Puzzle: Do All of the Pieces Now Fit?, 11 REV. FIN. ECON. 241, 254 (2002)).
201. The primary purpose of the nondistribution constraint is to provide an off-the-
shelf, enforceable legal term that offers the organization's customers or donors some
assurance that the organization will "devote all of its income to the [production of the]
services that it was formed to provide." Hansmann, supra note 169, at 506, 507. That said,
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Therefore, it is not the case that for-profits must only do what is
in their economic self-interest or that nonprofits must ignore their
economic self-interest. Accordingly, the double standard is not easily
justified by the legal distinction between for-profits and nonprofits.
The question remains: why does the double standard exist?
III. EXPLAINING WHY THE DOUBLE STANDARD EXISTS
Why is it that so many in corporate America regard the
educational setting as one that is naturally in harmony with
affirmative action while thinking of the corporate workplace as
antithetical to affirmative action such that they demand such a high
bar (i.e., the business case for diversity) in order to accommodate it?
One explanation is simply that business corporations have evolved
into "externalizing machines" 2"-that they have developed an
it's not entirely clear whether the nondistribution constraint achieves what it purports to
achieve. First, the constraint is poorly defined and has severe limitations, which arguably
help undermine its purpose. Id. at 507. Even statutes that proscribe distributing current
profits to controlling persons permit nonprofits to distribute all of the organization's assets
to its members at dissolution. Id. at 529-30 (noting this feature in the Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act of 1952, which was adopted by many states, and noting that this "places
only a limited qualification on the authors' markable willingness to abandon the
nondistribution constraint"). As noted by Henry Hansmann, "[s]uch authority for
distribution of assets to members on dissolution creates an enormous loophole in the
nondistribution constraint, for it means that, if members of a nonprofit organization wish
to derive profits from its activities, they need only wait until the organization is dissolved."
Id. at 574. This apparent looseness in defining the nondistribution constraint is
compounded by the looseness in defining who is a "member." Some statutes offer no
meaningful definition of the term "member." Id. at 578. Accordingly, it is theoretically
possible that anyone entitled to vote on the organization's matters (and thus exercising
control over it) will receive a profit distribution upon the organization's dissolution.
Second, the nondistribution constraint, like the other fiduciary standards applicable to
nonprofits, is poorly enforced by state attorneys general who typically have too few staff
and no effective system of financial reporting to enable them to properly supervise
nonprofits' affairs. Id. at 507. Third, the nondistribution constraint suffers from (perhaps
unavoidably) another fairly significant loophole, which may undermine its purpose. The
constraint only bars the distribution of net income. But "nonprofits are generally free to
pay reasonable compensation to individuals, including controlling individuals, for labor
services or capital [contributed] to the organization." Id. at 501. Recurring news reports of
the income of nonprofits being funneled into hefty salaries of managers who control the
entity raise serious questions about the effectiveness of the nondistribution constraint in
controlling agency costs in nonprofits. See, e.g., Milton Cerny et al., New Scrutiny of
College and University Executive Compensation and Unrelated Business Activity, 37 J.C. &
U.L. 93, 102 (2010); Felicity Barringer, Pay for Charity Leaders Raises Uneasy Question,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at A12; Jeff McDonald, Ex-Chief of County's YMCA Was Paid
Nearly $1 Million, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 10, 2010, at A2; Peter St. Onge,
How Much Is Enough?: Nonprofit Leaders Debate Whether Charity Should Begin with
Executive Paychecks, CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Oct. 19, 2009, at 1A.
202. See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF
PROFIT AND POWER 60 (2004).
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inexorable tendency to externalize the costs of their profit-making
activities while internalizing all economic benefits available to them.
Accordingly, they will generally resist taking on any costs unless
justified by the economic benefits. 203 As the story goes, they will not
do anything that smacks of altruism or advances social justice unless
they are required to do so by law, even as they insist that other
sectors should.2 0 While this explanation is plausible, it seems
caricatured. I want to explore an alternative and more charitable
explanation. In this Part, I argue that the double standard exists, at
least in part, because of how we construct and construe social
relationships in the university and business domains. As the
theoretical basis for my argument, I borrow heavily from
experimental studies and ethnographic field research on the social
psychology of sociality,205 as informed by the cognitive science of
categorization.206
Although most of us intellectually know that universities
sometimes chase profits and that businesses sometimes embrace
203. Cf id. ("Nothing in [the corporation's] legal makeup limits what it can do to
others in pursuit of its selfish ends, and it is compelled to cause harm when the benefits of
doing so outweigh the costs.").
204. Cf id. ("Only pragmatic concern for its own interests and the laws of the land
constrain the corporation's predatory instincts, and often that is not enough to stop it from
destroying lives, damaging communities, and endangering the planet as a whole.").
205. A growing body of scholarship in social psychology is devoted to exploring models
of human sociability-that is, how people "organize their social life in terms of their
relations with other people." Alan Fiske, The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality:
Framework for a Unied Theory of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL. REv. 689, 689 (1992);
see also JOHN F. DOVIDIO ET AL., THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
passim (2006) (exploring the evolution of altruistic behavior and its many manifestations);
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: GROUP PROCESSES, INTERGROUP
RELATIONS, AND HELPING (Stefan Stuirmer & Mark Snyder eds., 2009) (compiling
scholarly articles emphasizing helping in the social group context). For a recent
exploration of the legal and policy implications from the new "science of unselfish
prosocial behavior," see STOUT, supra note 36, at 11.
206. Since the 1970s, advances in the fields of cognitive psychology, cognitive
linguistics, artificial intelligence, and anthropology have provided a persuasive account of
how humans categorize people, things, and abstract concepts. See SUSAN T. FISKE &
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 94-102 (2008);
ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 25-41 (1999); GEORGE
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL
ABOUT THE MIND 5-154 (1987); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The
Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103,
1145-54 (2004); Gary Blasi, Lawyers, Guns and Money: Content Contextualism and the
Cognitive Foundations of Statutory Interpretation 49-85 (Berkeley Elec. Press, Working
Paper No. 197, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.comlexpresso/eps/197; see also Sung
Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV. 73, 95-111
(2010) (exploring the cognitive science of categorical thinking in the context of the
regulation of lawyers).
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philanthropy, we nonetheless rely on cognitive schemas that resist this
nuanced understanding. We tend to think of the university domain as
being associated with what I refer to here as "communal norms" and
the business domain as being associated with "market norms."207
Moreover, we tend to associate diversity initiatives and their ilk with
communal norms. As a result, diversity is seen as being naturally
compatible with the educational setting but in tension with the
business setting.
By "communal norms," I mean the unspoken social rules that
govern those social relations characterized by mutual concern for
each other's welfare.2 08 These norms emanate from our need for
security and fulfillment and the desire to belong to a community that
genuinely cares about one another's physical and emotional well-
being.209 Attributes that are associated with "communal norms" are
those of generosity, kindness, sharing, helping, intimacy, nurturance,
community, and mutual interdependence.2 10 The typical relationship
governed by strong communal norms is between family members and
close friends.211
In contrast, "market norms" govern market exchange
relationships and are more tightly associated with business
environments. Market norms are dominated by economic analysis,
embracing words like "wages, prices, rents, interest, and costs-and-
benefits."212 Attributes associated with market norms are self-
207. For purposes of this Article, my categorizations are rough simplifications of more
complex taxonomies and relational models developed by Alan Fiske. Fiske argues that
four (not two) psychological models of sociality describe all social interactions. They are
communal sharing, authority ranking, equality ranking, and market pricing. See Fiske,
supra note 205, at 689. By contrast, Margaret Clark and Judson Mills focus on two types of
interpersonal relationships: communal relationships and exchange relationships. See
Margaret S. Clark & Judson Mills, Interpersonal Attraction in Exchange and Communal
Relationships, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 12, 12-13 (1979) [hereinafter Clark
& Mills, Interpersonal Attraction].
208. Clark & Mills, Interpersonal Attraction, supra note 207, at 13 (explaining a
"communal relationship" as one in which "each [person] is concerned about the welfare of
the other"). The dichotomy between "communal relationships" and "exchange
relationships" has been criticized and answered. See C. Daniel Batson, Communal and
Exchange Relationships: What Is the Difference?, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 677, 678-81 (1993) (criticizing the distinction); Margaret S. Clark & Judson Mills,
The Difference Between Communal and Exchange Relationships: What It Is and Is Not, 19
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 684, 684-87 (1993) [hereinafter Clark & Mills,
The Difference] (defending the distinction).
209. Clark & Mills, The Difference, supra note 208, at 685.
210. See Fiske, supra note 205, at 695.
211. See Clark & Mills, Interpersonal Attraction, supra note 207, at 12-13.
212. DAN ARIELY, PREDICrABLY IRRATIONAL 68 (2008); see also Fiske, supra note
205, at 694-95.
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reliance, self-sufficiency, independence, individualism, efficiency,
hard work, competition, and inventiveness. 213 The typical relationship
governed by strong market norms is the relationship between one-
time buyers and sellers.
Here's an illustration. Suppose I am incompetent at debugging
computer problems. By contrast, suppose my partner is a computer
whiz. One day, I have an especially hard time figuring out how to
format a document using Microsoft's Styles & Formatting function.
Hearing my sighs and groans, he comes to my aid and resolves the
problem. It takes him fifteen minutes to debug my problem. In doing
so, he has saved me two hours of valuable time. To show my
gratitude, I reach into my wallet and pull out a $100 bill to hand to
him. After all, that is probably close to how much Geek Squad would
charge for the service. He is shocked and offended by my response.
Why?
Although the service he provided is highly commodifiable, our
relationship is squarely a communal one. His favor was motivated out
of a sense of caring and community, rather than out of a desire to
maximize his own scarce resources. Hence, my attempt to compensate
him with an equivalent value (in accordance with market norms)
would be inappropriate in this situation, which clearly calls for
communal norms. This is not to say that there are no reciprocity
pressures in the world of communal norms. It's just that those
pressures call for different responses. For example, if I asked my
friend to pick up my daughter from school on a day that I can't, it
would seem odd for me to say that it would be in exchange for my
picking up her son the next day. However, my friend would probably
be pleased if I later dropped off a small basket of delicious cream
puffs to thank her.
The fact that I am in a communal relationship with someone is a
strong indicator that communal norms should normally apply. But
this does not mean that communal norms are absent in market
domains or that market norms are entirely absent in communal
domains. Rather, the domain is but one factor (albeit perhaps the
most important one) to be considered when applying the complex
cultural mapping rules that guide which set of norms should dominate
in a given context.214 These mapping rules will not be found in any
213. See ARIELY, supra note 212, at 68; Fiske, supra note 205, at 695.
214. For example, people seem to regard themselves as having at least weak communal
ties with everyone, regardless of venue. See Clark & Mills, The Difference, supra note 208,
at 685. Most people will call an ambulance for a stranger who has collapsed in front of
one's house or one's office-without any expectation of repayment. See id. at 686.
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classroom textbook; rather, they have been socially ingrained since
childhood. Much of the recent research in the social psychology of
sociality aims to determine what conditions might activate which set
of norms in our culture. In particular, experiments seek to find out
when market norms are triggered.215 What's fascinating about these
experiments is the finding that the mere mention of money is capable
of activating market norms in ways that impact actual behavior.
Take, for example, the conscious priming216 studies conducted by
Kathleen Vohs, Nicole Mead, and Miranda Goode.2 17 Participants
were asked to rearrange sets of scrambled words to form sentences or
phrases. The control group was assigned the task of forming neutral
sentences, e.g., "It is cold outside." The other group (the "money"
condition) was tasked to form sentences or phrases relating to money,
e.g., "high-paying salary." 2 18 After finishing the unscrambling task,
participants were asked to complete a hard puzzle that required them
to arrange twelve disks into a square.21 9 As the experimenter left the
room, he told them that they could come to him for help.220
As it turned out, the participants in the money condition
wrestled with the puzzle for an average of five and a quarter minutes
before asking for help, whereas the participants in the control group
(neutral condition) requested help after about three minutes.221 It
appears that the mere thought of money, brought about by priming
"salary" during the scrambled-sentence task, activated market norms,
making the participants in the money condition (unwittingly) 222 more
215. See infra notes 217-55 and accompanying text.
216. "Conscious priming" or "postconscious automaticity" entails the "conscious
perception of the prime but no awareness of its effects on subsequent reactions." FISKE &
TAYLOR, supra note 206, at 29. For example, in one experiment, participants who were
instructed to imagine the daily routine of a typical professor subsequently ended up
outscoring the other participants (who had not been so instructed) in a game of Trivial
Pursuit. Id. Although participants were consciously aware that they were participating in
the task of imagining the life of a professor, they were not consciously aware that doing so
would affect or had affected their performance in a subsequent knowledge game. Id.
217. Kathleen Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCIENCE
1154 passim (2006); see also James Heyman & Dan Ariely, Effort for Payment: A Tale of
Two Markets, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 787, 787 (2004) (describing how money triggers market
norms).
218. Vohs et al., supra note 217, at 1154.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. (reporting results from Experiment 1).
222. Although participants in the money condition were consciously aware that they
were unscrambling words that invoked the concept of money, they were not consciously
aware that doing so would affect or had affected their behavior in the subsequent puzzle
task. See supra note 216 for an explanation about the degree of automaticity typically
present in conscious priming studies.
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persistent, self-reliant, and less willing to solicit help from the
experimenter.223  This experiment also suggests that we may
understand the communal notions of help and helpfulness to be
inconsistent with market norms.224
But the experiment did not end there. The authors of the study
also planted a "stranger," in reality a disguised confederate
experimenter, who "accidentally" dropped a box of pencils. 2 5 Did
these participants come to the aid of a stranger? Participants in the
money condition were less willing than participants in the neutral
condition to help pick up the pencils.226 in another experimental
variation, participants in the money condition were also less willing to
help an experimenter enter data27 and less willing to assist another
participant (in reality, a confederate) who seemed confused by the
instructions.228
Overall, the "money" participants exhibited characteristics
consistent with market norms: they were more independent,
persistent, self-reliant, and less attentive to others. These participants
preferred to spend more time alone2 29 and were more likely to choose
tasks requiring individual input, rather than team effort. 23 0 Even when
they decided where they wanted to sit, they tended to choose seats
farther away from whomever they were assigned to work with.231 In
short, just thinking about money made them behave more in line with
what you might expect from a "perfectly rational and purely self-
223. Vohs et al, supra note 217, at 1154.
224. See id. at 1155.
225. Id.
226. Id. (reporting results from Experiment 5).
227. Id. (reporting results from Experiment 3).
228. Id. (reporting results from Experiment 4).
229. Id. at 1156 (reporting results from Experiment 8).
230. Id. (reporting results from Experiment 9).
231. Id. (reporting results from Experiment 7).
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interested" homo economicus.232 Moreover, the "money" participants
were apparently unaware of this psychological transformation.233
Drawing on the relational models proposed by Alan Fiske, Vohs
et al. hypothesized that "money is linked to a focus on personal inputs
and outputs, which may manifest behaviorally as an emphasis on
personal performance." 23 4 Since money is a tool that facilitates the
exchange of goods and services to satisfy personal needs, we may
associate the construct of money with our individual selves. 235 And
because money is used to reward successful task completion which
typically follows performance efforts, "reminding people of the
concept of money would encourage individual performance
efforts."236 At the same time, thinking of life in "transactional terms
with inputs and expected outputs" seems inconsistent with the social
interconnectedness that one feels and expects from relationships with
family members and friends. 237 Accordingly, "being reminded of
money would make people less sensitive to the needs of others than
they would be without that reminder." 238 Thus, it appears from these
studies that subtle reminders of money can powerfully activate the
market norms of independence, self-reliance, persistence, and
individual effort. Simultaneously, the construct of money seems to
"crowd out" 239  communal notions of sharing, helping,
interdependence, and mutual interconnectedness.
232. Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2003)
(defining homo economicus as a "perfectly rational and purely self-interested actor[]"); see
also STOUT, supra note 36, at 4 (" 'Economic Man' does not worry about morality, ethics,
or other people. He worries only about himself, calculatingly and opportunistically
pursuing the course of action that brings him the greatest material advantage."). Other
scholars have used similar definitions. See, e.g., Harry S. Gerla, The Psychology of
Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39 Sw. L.J. 755, 757 n.12 (1985) (defining
homo economicus as "the hypothetical wealth and utility maximizing creature postulated
by classical microeconomists").
233. See supra note 216 for an explanation about the degree of automaticity typically
present in conscious priming studies.
234. Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Merely Activating the Concept of Money Changes






239. "Crowding Out Theory" predicts that "[w]here individuals perceive an external
intervention to be controlling, their intrinsic motivation to perform the task diminishes."
Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746, 747 (1997) (citing
EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-
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In case you doubt that similar effects can be attained outside of
psychology laboratories, consider the following field study. Uri
Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini studied ten private day care centers in
Israel to determine whether imposing a fine on parents who were late
in picking up their children was a useful deterrent.2 4 Surprisingly,
imposing the fine actually increased tardiness, rather than decreased
it,2 a finding that contradicts classical economic theory's prediction
that increasing the penalty for a behavior will reduce the occurrence
of that behavior.242 Why did the fine imposition increase tardiness?
One explanation is that introducing the fine inadvertently converted
what was more or less a "communal contract" between teachers and
parents into one that was more squarely a "market contract."2 43
Under the prior communal contract, if parents were late, they were
taking advantage of their teacher's generosity by encroaching on her
personal time.2"4 This would generate pangs of guilt and those feelings
motivated them to be more punctual in the future.245 Once the fine
was imposed, however, their understanding of the relationship was
transformed.246 Under the terms of the new market contract, the
penalty was predetermined and clear: it was the fine.247 Since the
penalty would be paid in full under the new market contract, parents
had no obvious reason to feel guilt,248 which turned out to be the more
DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 131 (1985)). Stated another way, "asking people
to focus on extrinsic incentives can have the unfortunate effect of 'crowding out' internal
incentives like trustworthiness, honor, and concern for others' welfare." STOUT, supra
note 36, at 251.
240. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2000).
241. Id. at 6.
242. See STOUT, supra note 36, at 192 ("From an economic perspective, these results
seem bizarre. How can raising the cost of an activity prompt people to 'buy' more of it?");
Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 602
(2001) ("A typical economic approach (in line with the economic theory of crime .. )
would suggest introducing a fine for collecting children late. Such a punishment is
expected to induce parents to reduce the occurrence of belatedly picking up their
children.").
243. Cf ARIELY, supra note 212, at 76-77 (distinguishing the pre-fine "social contract"
with the post-fine market contract).
244. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 240, at 13-14.
245. See id. at 14.
246. See id. at 10 (assuming that "the fine changes the agents' perception of the social
situation in which they are involved").
247. Id. at 14.
248. As explained by Gneezy and Rustichini, "Parents feel justified in their behavior
by a social norm that states, approximately: 'When help is offered for no compensation in
a moment of need, accept it with restraint. When a service is offered for a price, buy as
much as you find convenient.' " Id.
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effective deterrent in this situation.249 In short, the introduction of the
fine triggered market norms, converting an offer of help in a moment
of need to an extra service that could be bought at a price.250 Parents
began acting like homo economicus.2 51
These studies suggest that we tend to associate market norms
with money; indeed, thinking of money, whether brought about by
subtle reminders or actual fines, seems capable of activating market
norms in our behavior. Hence, it is plausible that merely thinking
about "jobs," "work," "business," or "business corporations" may
trigger the market norms of competition, self-reliance, independence,
individualism, and self-regarding behavior. These cognitive
associations in our heads may be reinforced in the real world by
annual performance reviews that typically evaluate individual
performance, rather than group effort or cooperation. Also,
particular management practices, such as the "rank and yank"
system,252 starkly remind employees that they are in cutthroat
competition with their colleague in the next cubicle and that they
should watch out-first and foremost-for "number one." As a result,
we may perceive market norms that stress individual performance
249. The authors admit that introducing a "large enough" fee would eventually reduce
the offending tardy behavior. Id. at 15. The fee imposed in this study, albeit not large, was
not trivial. See id. at 5 (explaining the size of the fine).
250. The Gneezy and Rustichini study also illustrates "crowding out" theory. See supra
note 239. Thus, interpreted from the standpoint of crowding out theory, the
introduction of a monetary fine transforms the relationship between parents and
teachers from a non-monetary into a monetary one. As a result, the parents'
intrinsic motivation to keep to the time schedules is reduced or is crowded out
altogether; the feeling now is that the teachers are 'paid' for the disamenity of
having to stay longer.
Frey & Jegen, supra note 242, at 602.
251. So what happened when the day care center removed the fine? For this crop of
parents, the tardiness did not improve. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 240, at 15. They
continued to pick up their kids late. In fact, there was even a slight increase in the number
of tardy pickups. Id. One interpretation is that when a communal norm gets replaced by a
market norm, the communal norm is difficult to reinstate. As explained by Gneezy &
Rustichini, "[o]nce a commodity, always a commodity." Id. at 14.
252. The "rank and yank" system of performance management was popularized by
Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric. ALAN MURRAY, THE WALL STREET
JOJRNAL ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT 33, 38 (2010). Under "rank and yank,"
every year employees of a company would be evaluated and ranked by their supervisors,
and the lowest-ranked ten percent would be fired at each evaluation. Id. at 38. Some have
been critical of this approach, noting that it can lower productivity and morale while also
discouraging teamwork. Id. at 38. Notably, Enron had used a "rank and yank" system.
BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 63-64 (2003) (describing Enron's
use of the "rank-and-yank" system in conducting performance reviews).
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and self-sufficiency as being fundamentally in tension with affirmative
action, which is grounded in communal values and the recognition
that we must sometimes transcend narrow self-interest to achieve a
more just world.
Conversely, the communal values underlying affirmative action
seem more naturally in line with the university setting. The university
setting is perceived as embodying the communal norms of sharing,
helping, mutual interdependence, and other-regarding behavior.
Although we all know that money is an integral part of university life
and universities have become increasingly profit-oriented, the
university is still thought of as an ivory tower that is insulated from
the dog-eat-dog values of the marketplace. In sum, we tend to think
of universities as operating in the safer, educational realm, where
supposedly much less is at stake.
This cognitive dichotomy, grounded in the intuitive distinction
between the commercial and educational spheres, is alluded to in the
GM Brief:
Businesses are primarily commercial, not educational, entities,
incapable of replicating the safe academic environments that
foster the "robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out
of a multitude of tongues." . . . Accordingly, universities, not
businesses, "are [the] ideal institutions to foster" the skills and
values necessary for participation in a heterogeneous society.25 3
From a business viewpoint, this cognitive dichotomy might well
be unfortunate, because, as others have argued,254 communal norms
that incorporate other-regarding behavior do not necessarily clash
with the values of the market world, for example, persistence and
hard work. While it is plainly true that paying more money can
motivate people to work harder than paying less money,255 it is also
253. GM Brief, supra note 4, at 14 (emphasis added).
254. See generally Elhauge, supra note 142 (arguing that optimizing corporate conduct
in a public corporation requires managerial discretion to sacrifice profits for the public
interest); Henderson & Malani, supra note 148 (arguing that for-profit corporations have
played an increasingly significant role in delivering altruism to individuals, that consumers
demand it, and that for-profits are capable of producing altruism efficiently and
competitively); Stout, supra note 232 (arguing that corporate boards are more effective if
they adopt an other-regarding perspective rather than a purely self-interested one).
255. There are experiments that show that if you give subjects a tedious task to
complete, paying more money (rather than less) usually gets better results. However,
experiments also show that paying no money at all also generates as good or almost as
good results as paying more money. See ARIELY, supra note 212, at 70-74; Heyman &
Ariely, supra note 217, at 788-92. In addition, as noted above, "crowding out" theory
suggests that, in some cases, paying money for a service may have the perverse effect of
suppressing the internal motivation to perform the service. See supra note 239, 250.
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true that a shared belief in a common cause (other than money) or a
strong sense of community can generate fierce loyalty and great
effort.26 For instance, Jennifer Brooke and Tom Tyler's contribution
to this conference explores how a "procedurally fair" workplace-one
that genuinely treats all employees with dignity and respect257 and
sends appropriate social signals emphasizing fairness-can cultivate
both a strong sense of community and a strong commitment to
superior performance.258 Moreover, these virtues can peacefully
coexist with meaningful diversity.2 59
All of the above is to say that the double standard may well exist
because the values underlying diversity initiatives are perceived to be
in tension with the values of business but perceived to be in harmony
with the values of universities.
CONCLUSION
So far, I've argued that business corporations invoke a double
standard on diversity. Corporate diversity must be justified by self-
interest; by contrast, educational diversity should be pursued
regardless of self-interest. I've also argued that this double standard
cannot easily be justified by facile distinctions, such as the for-
profit/nonprofit distinction. The psychology of human sociality helps
us understand why we easily fall into a double standard. But an
explanation is not quite the same as justification. Although wide
embrace of communal norms in the university may help explain why
256. Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A
Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 740-42 (2011) (citing studies). For
a current real-world example of a corporation that has generated a strong sense of
community while being wildly profitable, see Jeffrey M. O'Brien, Zappos Knows How to
Kick It, FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 2009, at 54, 55-56 (describing Zappos, which ranked twenty-
third in Fortune's 100 Best Companies to Work For); Christopher Palmeri, Now for Sale,
The Zappos Culture, BUS. WK., Jan. 11, 2010, at 57, 57.
257. As Brooke and Tyler have pointed out, one should not expect to recoup the
benefits of a diverse work force if the company recruits diverse employees but then
discourages their voice by pressuring them to conform. Brooke & Tyler, supra note 256, at
730-31. One component of a "procedurally fair" workplace is genuinely considering the
views of all employees. Id. at 728-29. Conducting employee surveys and later ignoring
them is an example of superficial compliance that does not amount to a procedurally fair
workplace. Id. at 730. On a broader scale, prosocial behavior may contribute to economic
productivity. See STOUT, supra note 36, at 19 (noting that "emerging evidence suggests
that cultural habits of unselfish prosocial behavior ... are powerful engines for social
stability and economic growth" and that "[tirust, honesty, and cooperation turn out to be
statistically associated not only with personal happiness, but with economic prosperity as
well").
258. Brooke & Tyler, supra note 256, at 740. I would like to thank John Darley for
making this point explicit to me.
259. Id.
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affirmative action is viewed as more appropriate in the educational
context, that doesn't entirely justify it. As demonstrated above, the
nonprofit/communal versus for-profit/market distinction is
exaggerated. Moreover, we can step back and ask the anterior
question of why market norms should dominate within the
corporation. We can't just say that those are our values; to do so
would be to make the naturalistic fallacy. And our values are not set
in stone or handed down by deities; they are in many ways chosen.
What, then, should we do about the double standard?
Generally speaking, if one seeks consistency, one can either level
down or level up. One could level down and transform educational
diversity as a call for universities to pursue diversity only when it's in
their self-interest. Or, one could level up and transform corporate
diversity with a call to pursue diversity even when it's beyond self-
interest. Now, some might think that "consistency is the hobgoblin of
little minds."260 But, on this matter, I disagree. If one enters a forum
of public discourse that demands reasoned justification, as in the case
with amicus briefs or press releases, I think it reasonable to demand
consistency.
Given space constraints, I will not try to make any systematic
argument why one solution is better than the other. Instead, I simply
state my view that corporations should level up-that is, support
corporate diversity without narrowly demanding that it advance the
economic self-interest of business corporations. My position is
grounded in the conviction that it is a collective societal failure if
minorities continue to dominate the lower echelons of corporate
hierarchies, never quite breaking through the glass ceiling to
participate meaningfully in mid-level management and beyond.2 61
I don't suppose that my analysis will prompt corporations to alter
their affirmative action policies or, if they don't have any, adopt them
in the first place. After all, it's possible that the business case for
diversity may in fact be nothing more than an expression of
skepticism about the social value of diversity.2 62 That said, my analysis
may urge a certain transparency about the nature of corporate
America's public, rhetorical commitment to diversity. In my view, the
260. Ralph Waldo Emerson, in FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 614, 618 (John Bartlett ed.,
10th ed. 1919) ("A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines.").
261. I also believe that it is a collective societal failure if we fail to build a middle class
that is not only stable and substantial but also racially diverse.
262. Some are skeptical that corporate executives can readily appreciate the social
value of diversity. For a summary of views, see Joo, supra note 36, at 362-63.
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business case for diversity is tantamount to saying that one supports
diversity in the abstract so long as one never has to pay for it.2 63
With respect to the particulars, I believe that there is a
provocative, yet robust, argument worth exploring that business
corporations may actually have a competitive advantage over
universities in advancing racial justice.2 " This is a comparative
institutional competency story. If we justify affirmative action as a
way to decrease prejudice by promoting intergroup contact265 during
the early stages of adulthood, then universities may well have the
upper hand. But if we justify affirmative action not for its debiasing
properties but for its material redistributive properties,266 then
business corporations-with their ability to confer the critical
business skills necessary to enable disadvantaged minorities to
prosper economically-may well be better suited. After all, what
other sector of American life can more efficiently and directly
263. Professor Coleman launches a passionate defense of the corporate commitment to
diversity. See Coleman, supra note 20, at 1007-08 ("The corporate amici pointed to their
own efforts to obtain a diverse workforce ... as the primary rationale for intervening into
a dispute involving diversity in higher education.... In pursuit of that goal, these amici
asserted that they had invested 'substantial financial and human resources to create and
maintain a diverse workforce.' "). Professor Coleman's reaction is predictable in light of
his reading of my argument primarily as a challenge to that commitment. But my main
quibble is not so much whether corporations have in fact invested "substantial financial
and human resources" in pursuit of diversity (although I would generally be more hesitant
than Professor Coleman in accepting naked claims at face value). Nor is my focus on the
normative issue of whether educational diversity should be pursued, which no one is
disputing and about which I have clearly expressed my views (notwithstanding Professor
Coleman's mischaracterizations). See supra notes 58, 136 and accompanying text. As I
have painstakingly argued, the main focus of my Article has been on the choice of
rationales for diversity. If we are to trust the self-reports of corporations, then they are
pursuing diversity because it helps them make money by helping them compete in the
global marketplace. In other words, corporations are pursuing diversity because it
maximizes their economic self-interest. And if corporations are merely acting in
accordance with what economic self-interest requires, then they should hardly be adulated
for doing so. Moreover, if they are merely acting to maximize their self-interest, then the
question is begged: why does Professor Coleman feel the need to defend them? Professor
Coleman offers no answer to that question. Rather, in cynical fashion, Professor Coleman
argues that "[iut is naive to think that universities will pursue diversity when it is not in
their interest to do so, just as it is naive to expect businesses to pursue diversity 'for its own
sake,' whatever that implies." Coleman, supra note 20, at 1015-16. It seems that Professor
Coleman, just like the corporations, finds the myriad social justice rationales for diversity
to be unpersuasive. As a result, Professor Coleman's commentary sounds like a corporate
apology.
264. Please see supra note 136 for a brief description of what I mean by "racial justice."
265. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 96, at 1102-15.
266. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1709, 1783-84
(1993) (suggesting that affirmative action be viewed through a distributive justice
framework, which refocuses the issue on "what would have been the proper allocation [of
benefits] in the absence of the distortion of racial oppression").
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promote the reallocation of economic resources necessary to decrease
persistent racial stratification?
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